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WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT AFTER INRE SEAGATE: JUST
WHAT IS "OBJECTIVELY RECKLESS" INFRINGEMENT?
RANDY R. MICHELETTI*
INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement lawsuits place over $15 billion in corporate assets
at risk each year. ' Compensatory damages for infringement-often exceed-
ing $10 million per suit-may be enhanced when the patentee proves, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant willfully infringed the
patent. 2 Willful infringement has traditionally been a subjective inquiry,
but the Federal Circuit recently adopted an objective standard in In re Sea-
gate Technology.3 The court delegated responsibility for development of
the new standard to future cases. 4 Because the financial stakes are high and
willfulness is alleged in nearly all patent infringement suits, uniform appli-
cation of the new standard is highly desirable for district courts and its
litigants.
Anyone who invents a "new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement the-
reof' is entitled to a patent in the United States. 5 Subject to some limits, 6
patents are granted for a wide variety of inventions including machines,
methods of manufacture, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, isolated genes,
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2009 (Order of the Coif).
M.S., Organic Chemistry, University of Pittsburgh, 2001. B.A., Augustana College, 1998. Registered
patent attorney. The author thanks Professor Timothy R. Holbrook for his valuable comments, and
Michelle, Aanesera and Tobias for their continuous love and support.
1. Based on empirical survey data collected by the American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion. See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007 25, 1-90, 1-91
(2007).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653,
675 (7th Cir. 1960).
3. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. Con-
volve, Inc. v. Seagate Tech., 128 S. Ct. 1445 (Feb. 25, 2008).
4. See id.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
6. For example, patentable inventions must also be useful (35 U.S.C. § 101), novel (35 U.S.C.
§ 102), nonobvious (35 U.S.C. § 103), and be sufficiently described in the patent application such that
another person skilled in the same art can make or use the patented invention without undue experimen-
tation (35 U.S.C. § 112).
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computer software, and even methods of conducting business. 7 As the
United States Supreme Court famously recognized, Congress intended
patent protection be available for "anything under the sun that is made by
man."
8
The U.S. patent system reflects a careful balance of interests between
society and inventors.9 In exchange for a time-limited exclusive right to
control the use of the patented invention, 10 an inventor must fully disclose
details of the invention so that another person with ordinary technical skills
in that field can recreate the patented invention without undue experimenta-
tion.11 Thus both the inventor and the public benefit from a granted patent:
The inventor reaps an immediate reward for her efforts in the form of an
exclusive right to control the use of the patented technology. 12 The public
receives both the immediate benefit of the patented technology itself, as
well as sufficient information to freely recreate the invention once the pa-
tent expires.13
Infringement occurs when anyone, "without authority [from the patent
owner,] makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells [the] patented invention, within
the United States ... during the term of the patent."' 14 Two important fea-
tures of patent infringement law are apparent from the statutory text. First,
infringement is a strict liability tort-the statute makes no mention of the
7. See, e.g., Method System and Computer Program for Shading, U.S. Patent No. 5,880,736
(filed Jun. 20, 1997); Glycopeptide Antibiotic Derivatives, U.S. Patent No. 5,840,684 (filed Mar. 24,
1995); Mutant Dwarfism Gene of Petunia, U.S. Patent No. 5,523,520 (filed Jun. 24, 1994); Packaging
Machine, U.S. Patent No. 5,488,812 (filed Feb. 2, 1994); Computerized Case History Business Method,
U.S. Patent No. 5,001,630 (filed Dec. 20, 1988); Process for Making Pigmented Ink Jet Inks, U.S.
Patent No. 5,026,427 (filed Oct. 12, 1988).
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Congressional Committee Re-
ports that accompanied the 1952 revisions to the Patent Act, S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952), and H.R.
REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
9. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 125-27, 131-32
(2006).
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (setting forth the statutory grant of rights as beginning on the day
the patent issues and terminating 20 years from the date the application for patent was filed).
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, T I (requirement that patent applications contain a fully enabling disclo-
sure); see also Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (describing conception of an
invention as occurring "only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordi-
nary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experi-
mentation.").
12. See Holbrook, supra note 9, at 131-32.
13. This policy of benefit to the public-generally referred to as the "quid pro quo" of the patent
system-has helped contour the practice of U.S. patent law in a number of ways, including determina-
tions of exactly when an invention is "born," see In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2004); whether an inventor has delayed too long to qualify for a patent, see Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. 1 (1829); whether a patent owner should be granted an injunction as a form of equitable remedy
for infringement, see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 544 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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infringer's state of mind or motivation. 15 Second, the list of prohibited
conduct is very broad; the scope of protection granted to patentees is wide
and far-reaching. 16 Although a patentee's term of rights is limited to only a
short time, the power conferred on the patentee for that exclusive period is
near-absolute.17
Collectively, patentees file thousands of infringement suits each
year. 18 Billions of dollars in alleged damages are litigated annually in pa-
tent infringement proceedings. 19 Sometimes infringement suits carry addi-
tional non-monetary consequences. 20  But the doctrine of willful
infringement extraordinarily raises the stakes. If the patentee can prove that
the defendant's infringement was willful, the district court has discretion to
increase total damages up to three times the compensatory award. 21 To add
insult to injury, the court may also award attorney fees when the defen-
dant's infringement was willful.2 2
In 2007 the Federal Circuit elevated the standard for proving willful-
ness from a subjective standard "akin to negligence" to an objective stan-
dard.23 Patentees seeking enhanced damages for willful infringement must
now first prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringe-
ment of a valid patent."'24 If the threshold question is satisfied, the patentee
must then prove "that [the] objectively-defined risk (determined by the
record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known to the
accused infringer or so obvious that it should have been known to the ac-
cused infringer. '25
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Until recently, patentees enjoyed absolute control over decisions to grant licenses to others.
The Supreme Court placed a condition on the otherwise absolute control in its landmark eBay case. See
eBay, 544 U.S. at 392.
18. 4,254 patent infringement suits were filed from 1999-2000. Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical
Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 230-31 (2004/2005).
19. See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, supra note 1.
20. When facing a claim of patent infringement, a defendant routinely files a counterclaim that the
patent is invalid or unenforceable. Successful defendants can thus turn the tables on a patentee and
simultaneously avoid the high cost of infringement damages and strip the patentee of his patent rights
altogether. See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW Ch. 10 (2d ed.
2006).
21. See35 U.S.C. § 284.
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 285; Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
23. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that the willfulness standard
up until this case represented "a lower threshold" than the Supreme Court advocated in Safeco Ins. Co.
ofAm. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2209, 2215, 2216 n.20 (2007)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
2010]
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While the court clearly expressed the two-part test patentees must sa-
tisfy, it did not elaborate on what types of evidence will be relevant.26 Dis-
trict courts have struggled to apply the new standard in subsequent
infringement cases, and will certainly benefit from some guidance. 27 Paten-
tees seeking to enforce their patent rights, and those trying to fairly com-
pete with patentees 28 will also benefit from some up-front guidance to more
accurately assess any patent-related risks a new business plan may bring.
Part II of this note describes in more detail how the doctrine of willful
patent infringement developed over time. Part III introduces the litigation
that prompted the Federal Circuit to dramatically change the willfulness
standard. Part IV reviews how district courts have struggled to apply the
new standard. Part V proposes a set of factors for analyzing each of the two
new willfulness prongs. Part VI applies the proposed factors to the facts in
Cohesive Technologies v. Waters,29 one of the first district court cases to
apply the new Seagate standard.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE
Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, 30 the infring-
er's intent is not relevant to determining whether the patent was infringed;
a defendant may be liable for patent infringement even absent actual know-
ledge of the patent itself.31 The infringer's state of mind is relevant, how-
ever, in determining whether the infringement was willful. Under
Section 284 of the Patent Act,32 a court may award enhanced damages to a
patentee up to three times the amount of compensatory damages from the
infringement. 33 The text of Section 284 has not changed substantially since
26. See id.
27. See infra Part Ill.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires patents to fully disclose the invention and enable a person of ordi-
nary skill in the relevant art to make or use the patented invention. In part, this provision seeks to
advance the policy goal of encouraging others to advance the relevant art by using patent disclosures to
invent alternative solutions to similar problems. See Holbrook, supra note 9, at 131 (citing Federal
Circuit case law acknowledging that the U.S. patent system encourages a patentee's competitors to
"design around" existing patents).
29. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.Mass. 2007).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) states in relevant part "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States ... any patented invention during the term
of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." See also In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
31. See id.
32. United States Code Title 35 is commonly referred to as the "Patent Act." Consistent with this
practice, the term "Patent Act" is synonymous with Title 35.
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (Whether damages are assessed by a jury or the court, "the court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed."). For an excellent summary of
the development of enhanced damages provisions in the Patent Act, See Matthew D. Powers & Steven
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183634 and specifies no standard under which enhanced damages are prop-
er.35 Shortly after Congress first granted courts discretion in levying en-
hanced damages, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of increased
statutory damages was to punish bad faith infringers above and beyond
actual damages they caused.36 By at least 1960, enhanced damages under
the Patent Act were judicially limited to cases where the infringement was
"conscious and wilful."37
A finding of willfulness is significant beyond even enhanced damages
under Section 284. Section 285 permits courts to award reasonable attorney
fees to the winning party in "exceptional cases."'38 When the prevailing
party is the patent holder, a finding that the infringement was willful is
sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees as well, which can signifi-
cantly increase the total liability for infringement. 39
A. Willful Infringement Before Seagate
Shortly after Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part to bring
consistency to the application of patent law in the federal courts, 40 the new
appellate court adjusted the standard for willfulness to favor patentees over
alleged infringers. 41 In Underwater Devices v. Morrison-Knudsen, the
court held that when "a potential infringer has actual notice of another's
patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing. ' 42 As the court explained in a later case,
C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 53 (2001).
34. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 33, at 66-68.
35. See id.
36. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1853) (holding that the Patent Act of 1836
granted courts discretion in imposing enhanced damages to correct the unjust situation where a defen-
dant who infringed in good faith was subject to liability for treble damages just as a "wanton and mali-
cious pirate" were).
37. Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 675 (7th Cir. 1960).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
39. See nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int'l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming a
district court that awarded over $2 million in compensatory damages, doubled the compensatory dam-
ages because the patent infringement was willful, and further awarded reasonable attorney fees under
§ 285 because the case was exceptional). While no two infringement cases are alike, a recent report by
the American Intellectual Property Law Association found that total median costs for patent litigation in
2007 ranged from $600,000 (for suits where less than $1 million was at risk) up to $5 million (for
actions risking more than $25 million). Since 2001, the total cost of litigation for patent infringement
has risen from 20-68%. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASS'N, supra note 1, at 25.
40. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573-74
(quoting S.Rep. 97-275, 97th Cong., I st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15).
41. See Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir.
1983). See also Lewis R. Clayton, "Seagate's" Objective Standard- "State of Mind" Irrelevant, 238
N.Y. L.J. 3, 6 (2007).
42. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389.
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placing the affirmative duty on the infringer was necessary to correct for
"wide-spread disregard of patent rights. '43
The patentee bears the burden to show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that infringement was willful. 44 Underwater Devices arguably per-
mitted patentees to shift that burden onto the infringer by little more than
notice pleading.45 It is no surprise, therefore, that nearly all patent in-
fringement plaintiffs allege willful infringement. 46 In a recent empirical
study of willful infringement, 47 then-Professor and now-Judge Kimberly
Moore of the Federal Circuit reasoned that the high rate of willful in-
fringement allegations is probably due to two benefits the patentee gains by
alleging willfulness.
First, Underwater Devices permitted patentees to gain valuable insight
into potential defenses the infringer will rely upon to avoid liability for
even "ordinary" infringement.48 When an infringement defendant elected to
assert an advice of counsel defense49 against an allegation of willfulness,
privilege was necessarily waived as to all documents related to that de-
fense-sometimes even as to communications related only to trial strategy
43. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) [hereinafter Knorr-Bremse].
44. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
45. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1349 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
Specifically, the separate opinion stated that
a potential infringer's mere failure to engage in due care is not itself reprehensible conduct.
To hold that it is effectively shifts the burden of proof on the issue of willfulness from the pa-
tentee to the infringer, which must show that its infringement is not willful by showing that it
exercised due care.
Id.
46. For an excellent empirical study of willful infringement pleading and a comparison between
jury verdicts and bench trials on those claims, see Moore, supra note 18 (finding that willful infringe-
ment was alleged in over 92% of 1,721 patent infringement cases that were resolved from 1999-2000).
Ms. Moore was confirmed as Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit in September 2006, but took no part
in the court's In re Seagate decision. See In re Seagate Tech., 297 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(unnumbered footnote).
47. Moore, supra note 18.
48. See id. at 232-234. To satisfy the "affirmative duty of care" outlined in Underwater Devices, a
potential infringer routinely obtains an opinion from counsel that analyzes the patents at issue for
validity (was the patent properly granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office?), enforcea-
bility (did the applicant obtain the patent through fraudulent or inequitable conduct before the Patent
and Trademark Office?), and infringement (will the potential infringer's proposed conduct actually
infringe on the patentee's rights as granted in the patent document?). At trial, failure to provide the
court with this opinion can lead to an inference that the infringer's conduct was willful. But offering the
court (and opposing counsel) the opinion to avoid a negative inference also necessarily broadcasts the
infringer's likely defenses at trial-invalidity, unenforceability, and/or noninfringement-as outlined in
the opinion itself
49. An opinion of counsel is a legal analysis of relevant patents related to the client's intended
course of conduct. A defendant asserts an advice of counsel defense by entering the opinion of counsel
into evidence.
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on the willfulness issue.50 Second, because the willfulness allegation is
usually found in the patentee's prayer for relief as a request for enhanced
damages under Section 284, the potential payoff of treble damages comes
at an insignificant cost: the patentee merely has to request enhanced dam-
ages in the complaint and cite the statute.5 1
In addition, the affirmative duty doctrine presented an odd paradox out
of touch with the policy rationales underlying the patent system. Because
actual knowledge of the patent triggered a duty to investigate potential
infringement, Underwater Devices may have created a powerful disincen-
tive to read patents. 52 In other words, the risk of willful infringement under
a subjective standard vanishes if patents aren't read because the infringer
had no actual knowledge of the patent in the first place. 53 And yet a prima-
ry objective of the patent system is to disseminate enabling knowledge of
new inventions to the public. 54
In Underwater Devices the court hoped to reduce widespread apathy
to patentees' rights by requiring potential infringers affirmatively seek an
opinion of counsel upon notice of a competitor's patent. 55 Should a defen-
dant fail to assert an opinion as a defense to a charge of willfulness, the
fact-finder was permitted to infer that advice was either not obtained or that
any advice solicited suggested that the defendant's proposed conduct would
infringe valid U.S. patents. 56 Either way, a defendant faced a tough choice
after Underwater Devices: waive attorney-client privilege for all willful-
ness-related documents or permit the fact-finder to infer that advice was not
obtained or was obtained but warned of likely infringement.
In Knorr-Bremse Systeme fuer Nutzfahreuge v. Dana57 ("Knorr-
Bremse"), the court removed the negative inference permitted by an in-
fringer's failure to offer opinion of counsel to rebut a willful infringement
allegation. 58 The court based this decision not on apathy for patentees'
rights, but because the affirmative duty imposed "inappropriate burdens on
the attorney-client relationship."'59 Relying on the Supreme Court's charac-
50. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1372.
51. See Moore, supra note 18.
52. See Holbrook, supra note 9, at 142-43 (arguing that the risk of willful infringement discou-
rages competitors from reading patents).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 125. This is the "quid pro quo" rationale for extending time-limited exclusive rights
to a patentee.
55. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
56. See id. (citing Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1344.
59. Id. at 1343.
20101
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terization of the attorney-client privilege as "the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to common law" 60 and its critical
purpose of fostering "full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients, ' 61 the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the risk to defen-
dants created by Underwater Devices was unwarranted and would lead to
the erosion of the privilege itself.62 Knorr-Bremse ultimately eliminated an
infringer's difficult choice between handing the patentee his trial strategy
playbook and risking an adverse inference by refusing to turn over any
opinions of counsel. 63
Two years later, the Federal Circuit took a small step back from
Knorr-Bremse when it held that an accused infringer waived attorney-client
privilege as to any communications with any counsel on the same subject
matter, even if the infringer did not rely on that advice. 64 The court's hold-
ing in In re Echostar Communications Corp. ("Echostar")65 made no dis-
tinction between opinion counsel and trial counsel, as long as the attorney
actually communicated the opinion to the client.66 Although the primary
issue before the Federal Circuit was the scope of waiver of attorney-client
privilege, the court's holding returned a potent offensive weapon to paten-
tees. After Echostar, any accused infringer that relied on an opinion of
counsel as a defense to a willful infringement allegation ran the risk that it
might also have to turn over its trial strategy regarding the patent's validity,
unenforceability, or non-infringement. 67
B. Tests for Willful Infringement Before Seagate
Although the Federal Circuit has repeatedly adjusted the scope of at-
torney-client privilege, it has been remarkably consistent in its concept of
what willful conduct looks like. In Bott v. Four Star, the Federal Circuit
adopted three factors from the Tenth Circuit to determine whether an in-
fringer's conduct, under all the circumstances, was willful. 68 The Bott Fac-
tors consider (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or
design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's
60. Id. at 1344 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1303.
67. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
68. See Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Lam, Inc. v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474-75 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982)).
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patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-
faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; and (3) the in-
fringer's behavior as a party to the litigation. 69
Six years later, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the three Bott Factors
and approved six more in Read v. Portec.70 Specifically, the court recog-
nized that the three Bott Factors were appropriate, but not necessarily com-
prehensive enough to satisfy the "totality of the circumstances" standard. 71
Read required courts to also consider: (4) the defendant's size and financial
condition, (5) the closeness of the case, (6) the duration of the defendant's
conduct, (7) any remedial action by the defendant, (8) the defendant's mo-
tivation for harm, and (9) whether the defendant attempted to conceal its
misconduct. 72
The Bott and Read Factors 73 served as the exclusive test for willful-
ness in patent litigation for over twenty years. The inquiry focused on the
infringer's subjective state of mind in an effort to punish bad-faith infring-
ers for disregarding a competitor's patent rights.74 Courts also used the Bott
and Read Factors to gauge the level of damage enhancement appropriate in
a given case once willfulness was found. 75 But litigation that commenced
in 2000 over digital storage technology would prove to be the demise of the
subjective test.76
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADOPTS "OBJECTIVE RECKLESSNESS"
WILLFULNESS STANDARD IN SEAGATE
Originally a discovery dispute, Convolve v. Compaq Computer77 re-
sulted in one of the most significant-and unexpected-changes to patent
law in 2007.78 While the initial conflict focused exclusively on the extent
69. Id.
70. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
71. Id.
72. See id. (internal citations omitted).
73. The Bott and Read Factors are often collectively referred to as the "Read Factors." For the
analytical purposes of this article, however, they will be referred to separately as the "Bott Factors" or
the "Read Factors."
74. See Read, 970 F.2d at 826 ("The paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement
and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct based on all the facts and cir-
cumstances.") (emphasis added).
75. See id.
76. Convolve, Inc., and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology filed suit against Compaq
Computer and Seagate Technology on July 13, 2000. Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 224
F.R.D. 98, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
77. See id.
78. Other significant changes to patent law in 2007 included a dramatic shift in obviousness
jurisdprudence (KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)), clarification from the Supreme
Court on licensee standing for Declaratory Judgment actions (Medlmmune v. Genentech, 127 S. Ct.
2010]
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of the scope of the defendant's waiver of privilege, the Federal Circuit
capitalized on the opportunity to bring patent law principles more in line
with other civil tort regimes.7 9
A. Procedural Posture of In re Seagate
In 2000-six years before the Federal Circuit's Echostar decision-
Convolve, Inc. ("Convolve"), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo-
gy (MIT) filed suit against Compaq Computer Corp. ("Compaq") and Sea-
gate Technology, Inc. ("Seagate") alleging patent infringement. 80 Convolve
and MIT owned patents covering "Input Shaping" technology8' for com-
puter disk drives. 82 In its amended complaint, Convolve and MIT alleged
that Compaq and Seagate willfully infringed the Input Shaping patents. 83
After receiving notice that Convolve was suing for patent infringe-
ment, Seagate retained patent attorney Gerald Sekimura to analyze the
Convolve and MIT patents and Seagate's products. 84 Sekimura generated
two opinions that concluded that the two Input Shaping patents were both
invalid, that one was possibly unenforceable because Convolve had not
disclosed relevant prior art to the patent examiner,85 and that Convolve had
failed to show that any of Seagate's existing products infringed the issued
patents, 86
By early 2002, Convolve was granted a patent on its "Quick and
Quiet" technology, 87 and amended its complaint with an additional in-
fringement claim and a request for enhanced damages based on Compaq
and Seagate's alleged willful infringement. 88 Sekimura again provided
Seagate with an opinion concluding that many of the claims in the newly
764 (2007)), and proposed changes to the rules for securing patent protection in the PTO (preliminarily
enjoined by Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007)) and the Patent Act (see H.R. 1908,
110th Cong. (2007)).
79. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
80. See Convolve, Inc., 224 F.R.D. at 99.
81. See U.S. Patent No. 4,916,635 (filed Sept. 12, 1988); U.S. Patent No. 5,638,267 (filed June 15,
1994).
82. Convolve, Inc., 224 F.R.D. at 99.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 99-100. Apparently Compaq retained a different patent attorney about a year after
Seagate did, but terminated that relationship when it learned that Sekimura was already well into his
analysis on Seagate's behalf. Id.
85. In general, a claim in a patent is unenforceable when the applicant fails to disclose relevant
prior art to the Patent and Trademark Office while the application is pending. See Union Pacific Re-
sources Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
86. Convolve, Inc., 224 F.R.D. at 100.
87. See U.S. Patent No. 6,314,473 (filed Mar. 4, 1999).
88. Convolve, Inc., 224 F.R.D. at 99.
[Vol 84:3
WILLFUL PA TENT INFRINGEMENT
issued patent were invalid and that Seagate was not infringing the patent
even the claims were valid.89
Seagate at all times retained separate trial counsel who were complete-
ly independent from Sekimura. 90 To defend against Convolve's claim of
willful infringement, Seagate notified the court that it intended to rely on
Sekimura's three opinions.91 But based on Echostar,92 the district court
granted Convolve's motion to compel Seagate to produce all communica-
tions with counsel-including trial counsel-on the three topics discussed
in Sekimura's opinions: infringement, invalidity, and enforceability. 93
B. Seagate's Writ of Mandamus
When the district court denied its motion for a stay and certification of
interlocutory appeal, Seagate petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus. 94 The Federal Circuit agreed that Seagate had "no other means
of attaining the relief desired"95 and granted the petition to prevent wrong-
ful exposure of privileged communications. 96 The court stayed the district
court's discovery orders pending the results of the appellate review.97
Seagate's petition raised two issues concerning the extent of attorney-
client privilege and are beyond the scope of this note.98 Although not part
of Seagate's mandamus petition, the Federal Circuit certified a third ques-
tion sua sponte:
Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard announced in
Underwater Devices... on the issue of waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege, should this court reconsider the decision in Underwater Devices
and the duty of care standard itself?99
89. Id. at 100.
90. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
91. Id.
92. See In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 448 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
93. Id.
94. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 214 F. App'x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
95. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1367 (citing Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989)).
96. Id. (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
97. In re Seagate Tech., 214 F. App'x at 997.
98. The Federal Circuit's first two certified questions were "(1) Should a party's assertion of the
advice of counsel defense to willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege to
communications with that party's trial counsel?" and "(2) What is the effect of any such waiver on
work-product immunity?" The court held that, as a general rule, reliance on opinion of invalidity,
unenforceability, or non-infringement does not automatically waive the attorney-client privilege as to
trial counsel, and similarly, as a general rule, reliance on opinion counsel's work product does not
waive work product immunity as to trial counsel. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1367, 1374, 1376.
99. Id. at 1367.
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The court noted that the development of willfulness doctrine has led to
"practical dilemmas... in the areas of attorney-client privilege and work
product protection" and therefore en banc reexamination of the willfulness
standard was warranted. 100
C. Seagate's Holding: "Willfulness" Now Requires a Showing of "Ob-
jective Recklessness"
The Federal Circuit appeared as concerned that willfulness in the pa-
tent infringement context was out of line with other areas of tort law than
its interplay with the attorney-client relationships.101 In particular, the court
noted that the current standard for showing willful patent infringement
resembled something close to negligence, while other areas of civil liability
link willfulness with conduct at least reckless in nature. 102
The Supreme Court's decision reviewing enhanced damages under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in Safeco Insurance Company ofAmeri-
ca v. Burr10 3 less than three months before Seagate further validated the
Federal Circuit's decision to review its willfulness standard in patent in-
fringement suits. 104 The FCRA permits courts to award punitive damages
to plaintiffs that can prove the defendant "willfully fail[ed] to comply with
[the FCRA]." 105 Like the Patent Act, the FCRA does not define willful-
ness, but the Supreme Court held in Safeco that "standard civil usage thus
counsels reading § 1681 n(a)'s phrase 'willfully fails to comply' as reaching
reckless FCRA violations."' 06
The Supreme Court's objective interpretation of civil "willfulness"
conflicted with the Federal Circuit's subjective, pseudo-negligence stan-
100. Id. Convolve and MIT argued in their reply brief that addressing Underwater Devices would
amount to an advisory opinion. Oppositions of Respondents at 48-59, In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Misc. No. 830), available at 2007 WL 1685896 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal
Circuit responded to this assertion (echoed by the Houston Intellectual Property Law Association in its
amicus brief (Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Houston Intellectual Property Law Association at
2-5, In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Misc. No. 830), available at 2007 WL
1032694) by noting that "it is indisputable that the proper legal standard for willful infringement in-
forms the relevance of evidence relating to that issue and, more importantly here, the proper scope of
discovery." In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371-72 (citing U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993)).
101. The Federal Circuit pointed out, for example, that willful copyright infringement requires at
least a showing that the defendant "recklessly disregarded the possibility that its conduct represented
infringement." In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262
F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See id.
103. 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
104. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1370-71.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
106. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209.
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dard under Bott, Read, and Underwater Devices.'1 7 In Seagate, the Federal
Circuit rejected that subjective standard in favor of a new willfulness stan-
dard for patent infringement suits: Patentees must now show the infringer
acted with at least "objective recklessness" to justify enhanced damages
under Section 284.108
More specifically, a patentee must now satisfy a two-part test to meet
Seagate's willfulness standard. 109 First, it must show "by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high like-
lihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent." lO Then,
the patentee must also show "that this objectively-defined risk (determined
by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known
to the accused infringer or so obvious that it should have been known to the
accused infringer."'
The Federal Circuit left the question of what types of evidence are re-
levant to the new two-part test largely unanswered. 12 But the court was not
completely silent on what factors may be considered under the new objec-
tive standard. First, Circuit Judge Haldane Mayer noted in the majority
opinion that prelitigation conduct is likely to be much more probative of
the threshold question than post-filing conduct. 113 Similarly, the court
opined that a genuine issue of the patent's validity or the defendant's in-
fringement "is likely sufficient" to nullify a claim of willfulness based on
post-filing infringing conduct.114
The only other clue given by the court was a cryptic one: concurring
Circuit Judge Pauline Newman suggested that "the standards of fair com-
merce, including the reasonableness of the actions taken in the particular
circumstances," should inform the willfulness inquiry.115 The majority
opinion acknowledged such standards "would be among the factors a court
might consider." ' 1 6 Judge Newman only slightly elaborated that the "stan-
107. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (noting the tension between the willfulness standard
in patent infringement suits with willfulness standards in other civil contexts); Safeco, 126 S. Ct. at
2209.
108. In reSeagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
109. See id.
110. Id. (citing Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2215).
111. Id. at 1371.
112. See id. ("We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of this standard.")
(footnote omitted).
113. See id. at 1374 (noting that, while patent infringement is an ongoing offense, a patentee must
have a "good faith basis for alleging willfulness" in the complaint). Judge Mayer further noted that a
patentee's failure to secure injunctive relief is a strong indicator that the infringer's conduct was not
reckless. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring opinion).
116. See id. at 1371 n.5.
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dards of fair commerce" may include the "reasonableness of the [possible
infringer's] actions taken in the particular circumstances." 1 17 Yet she, too,
seemed satisfied to allow evolution of the new standard by relying on
"judicial wisdom.., to show the way, in the common-law tradition."' 18
Beyond these few suggestions, Seagate provides little concrete guid-
ance for development of the objective recklessness standard. Competitors
have little idea what conduct is appropriate after Seagate. Arguably, Sea-
gate's attempt to raise the standard of willfulness from something "akin to
negligence"119 to objective recklessness will not put good faith competitors
at any more risk than under the old subjective standard. 120 But without a
clear understanding of the new objective recklessness standard for willful-
ness, the court's unspecific holding may undermine the patent system's fair
competition policy basis.
And because most patent infringement cases will very likely involve
allegations of willful infringement, district courts also face a considerable
challenge: Just what is "objective recklessness" with respect to patent in-
fringement? The statute provides no test or factors relevant to an inquiry
into willfulness. 121 The few clues given by the Federal Circuit merely pro-
vide a general direction for district courts. 122 Based on the largely inconsis-
tent application of Seagate, however, it is clear that the "common-law
tradition" has led to significant confusion and disagreement among the
district courts.
III. INITIAL JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SEAGA TE'S OBJECTIVE
RECKLESSNESS STANDARD: DISTRICT COURTS ARE CONFUSED
With the number of patent infringement suits filed annually, it is no
surprise that district courts had immediate opportunities to apply the Sea-
gate standard. Initial application of the new standard has primarily focused
on the threshold question: whether the defendant "acted despite an objec-
tively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent."'123 A handful of courts have also addressed the secondary question:
117. Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring opinion).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1371.
120. See id. (suggesting that the Supreme Court's understanding of willfulness requires at least a
showing of recklessness, whereas willful patent infringement allows punitive damages for something
"akin to negligence").
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
122. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 ("We leave it to future cases to further develop the
application of this standard.").
123. Id.
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whether the objective risk of infringement was known or so obvious that it
should have been known to the accused infringer. 124 District courts apply-
ing Seagate appear to be confused on a number of fronts, however.
A. District Courts are Struggling to Apply Seagate's
New Willfulness Standard.
Because the Federal Circuit provided only vague suggestions on how
to assess willfulness post-Seagate, district courts generally have struggled.
First, courts often conflate the two stepwise Seagate questions into a holis-
tic "objective reklessness" inquiry. For example, the Northern District of
California correctly recited the new willfulness inquiry as a two-step analy-
sis beginning with assessment of the defendant's actions as creating an
objectively high likelihood of infringement. 125 The court then rationalized
its denial of the patentee's motion for summary judgment solely based on
the lack of an objectively high likelihood of infringement of a valid patent,
but included facts clearly showing the defendant knew or should have
known about the plaintiff s patent. 126
Courts also are unsure of the continued relevance of the Bott and Read
Factors in the Seagate analysis. 127 On the one hand, those Factors were
developed under the former subjective standard for willfulness. But on the
other hand, they not only address whether the defendant infringed willfully,
but also how much the court should enhance damages. 128 Perhaps simply
from a lack of guidance on application of the new standard, courts appear
to be gravitating towards the practical utility found in the Bott and Read
Factors as a starting point.129
124. See id.
125. See Depomed, Inc. v. Ivax Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
126. See id. at 1186. The court stated that:
Third, there is evidence that the '475 patent and an agreement to license the patent to a third
party were well publicized .... In sum, there is ample evidence upon which a reasonable ju-
ror could base the conclusion that [the defendant acted] despite an objectively high likelihood
that is actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. (emphasis added).
Id.
127. See, e.g., Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing the closeness of the infringement issue as the primary reason that the defendant
could not have infringed willfully); Depomed, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 ("it is unsettled whether
the ... factors identified in Read ... remain relevant to the wilfulness inquiry.").
128. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-28 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
129. See, e.g.,Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1112-17 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); Finjan Software, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., No. 06-369, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72825 at *46-52 (D. Del. 2009).
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One assertive district court announced a six-factor test for willfulness
under the new Seagate standard.130 To decide the issue of willfulness under
Seagate, the district court stated that important factors to consider include:
(1) whether there was a bona fide disagreement regarding patent invalidi-
ty or infringement, (2) whether the infringer solicited or followed the ad-
vice of counsel, (3) whether there was continued infringement after
notice of probable infringement was received, (4) whether there was a
degree of similarity between the patented and accused devices, (5)
whether the infringer took efforts to avoid infringement, and (6) whether
the infringer was indemnified against infringement costs. 131
Interestingly, the district court cited no authority for these six factors,
nor did it explain how these factors were derived or even why they inform
the inquiry.
More troublesome, however, is that the asserted six-factor test com-
pletely conflates Seagate's threshold question with the secondary question.
Factor 3, for example, considers whether the infringer knew or should have
known of the risk of infringement. Surrounding that factor are Factors 1, 2,
and 4, all of which help define the threshold question: whether there was an
objectively high risk of infringement in the first place. Factor 6 (and per-
haps Factor 3) appear to guide the court in determining the extent of dam-
age enhancement, but the district court did not rationalize, discuss or even
apply Factor 6 to the facts before it.132
In contrast, the district court in Church & Dwight v. Abbott Laborato-
ries carefully analyzed the evidence presented under Seagate's two-part
test. 133 In that case, the patentee sued Abbott over three patents covering
various aspects of home pregnancy test kits.134 A jury found that Abbott
infringed the patents and that the claims at issue were not invalid. 135 Fur-
thermore, the jury concluded that Abbott's infringement was willful. 136
After trial, Abbott moved, inter alia, for judgment as a matter of law that
its infringement was not willful.
As to Seagate's threshold question, the court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of an objectively high likelihood of
infi-ingement of a valid patent. Specifically, the court noted that
130. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, 103-04 (D. Mass. 2007).
131. Id.
132. See idat 105-06.
133. Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-2142, 2008 WL 2565349 at *10-11 (D.
N.J. Jun. 24, 2008).
134. Id. at*1.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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the jury was shown evidence that: (1) the... patents, because they were
issued, were presumptively valid; (2) Abbott's invalidity defenses were
not very strong and were previously rejected by the USPTO; (3) that Ab-
bott did not contest infringement of [one of the patents] at trial; and (4)
its infringement arguments as to the other patents were not convinc-
ing.137
Thereafter, the court concluded that the patentee met its burden to
demonstrate that the objectively high risk was known to Abbott, or was so
obvious that Abbott should have known of it, reasoning that
the jury was shown evidence that: (1) [the patentee] put Abbott on notice
of its infringement of the.. . Patents; (2) [the patentee's] predecessor no-
tified Abbott that "it was very difficult to sell visually readable lateral
flow test strips without infringing" on the... Patents; (3) Abbott knew
that its infringement was an issue; (4) Abbott was "not going to change"
until it could "investigate and do otherwise;" (5) Abbott sought to "in-
sure" itself against liability exposure via indemnifications; and (6) Ab-
bott sold its Diagnostics unit in part to avoid current and potential
intellectual property issues.138
As a result, the court denied Abbott's motion for judgment as a matter
of law. 139
1. Judicial Interpretation of Seagate's Threshold Question: Evidence
Considered in Assessing the Objective Likelihood of Infringing a Valid
Patent
Despite some confusion among the district courts in the proper me-
thod to apply Seagate, some trends have already emerged. First, every dis-
trict court applying Seagate has concluded that a defendant's effort to
design around the patent at issue signals an objectively low likelihood that
its conduct constituted infringement of a valid patent. 140 Second, district
courts continue to view competent opinions of counsel as highly relevant.
Rather than a complete defense to a claim of willful infringement, however,
most courts recognize that such opinions now merely help define the objec-
137. ld. at *10.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *11.
140. See, e.g., Fisher Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., No. 01-051, 2008 WL 1976624 at *6 (D. Del.
May 5, 2008) (although the jury found that Safety 1st willfully infringed Fisher-Price's patent under the
pre-Seagate willfulness standard, the court refused to award enhanced damages post-Seagate in part
because "Safety 1st engaged in efforts to redesign [the infringing] product after the first infringement
verdict."); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Agfa-Gevaert N.V., 560 F. Supp. 2d 227, 303-05 (W.D.N.Y. 2008);
Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, 105 (D. Mass. 2007); Rhino Assoc., L.P. v.
Berg Mfg. & Sales Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658-59 (M.D. Pa. 2007); In re Muth Mirror Sys.,
L.L.C., 379 B.R. 805, 827 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).
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tive likelihood of infringement under Seagate.141 As before, an opinion
must be objectively competent before a court will consider its contents as
signaling a low objective likelihood of infringement. 142
A few district courts have linked invalidity arguments raised at trial to
Seagate's threshold question. 143 Courts generally understand Seagate to
imply that credible invalidity arguments indicate an objectively low like-
lihood of infringement. 144 Similarly, courts have held that weak or frivol-
ous invalidity arguments presented at trial, or invalidity arguments already
rejected by the USPTO, all infer an objectively high risk of infringe-
ment. 145 Indeed, the Federal Circuit endorsed the relationship between
invalidity arguments raised at trial and Seagate's threshold question in
Black & Decker v. Robert Bosch Tool.146 In this non-precedential opinion,
the court similarly concluded that credible invalidity arguments raised dur-
ing infringement proceedings indicate that the likelihood that the defen-
dant's conduct constituted infringement was objectively low. 147 Some
courts have rejected invalidity arguments raised at trial as probative of
141. See Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 939,
956 (N.D. 111. 2008) (letters from counsel stating that there can be no infringement without a court
determination of infringement were ineffective to shield infringer from willful infringement determina-
tion); Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., No. 8:07CV70, 2008 WL 3875299 at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2008) (defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment of no willful infringement was denied because patentee presented
evidence showing genuine issues of material fact as to whether the accused infringer obtained or fol-
lowed the advice of counsel); VNUS Medical Techs., Inc. v. Diomed Holdings, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d
1072, 1075-76 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05; TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T
Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578-79 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
142. See VNUS Medical Techs., 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1076; Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, 553
F. Supp. 2d at 956.
143. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., No. 03-0597-PHX-MHM,
2008 WL 2958968 at *2 (D. Ariz. Jul. 29, 2008) (defendant's invalidity argument based on three prior
art references was directly contradicted by the USPTO prosecution history of the patent-in-suit); Church
& Dwight Co., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-2142, 2008 WL 2565349 at *10 (D. N.J. Jun. 24, 2008)
(defendant's motion for JMOL of no willful infringement was denied in part because its "invalidity
defenses were not very strong and were previously rejected by the USPTO"); Kleen-Tex Indus., Inc. v.
Mountville Mills, Inc., No. 3:03-CV-093-JTC, 2008 WL 2486363 at *8 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2008) (citing
Black & Decker, 260 F. App'x at 291 ("a 'credible invalidity argument' is sufficient.., to avoid a
finding of willful infringement.")); Pivonka v. Central Garden & Pet Co., No. 02-cv-02394-RPM, 2008
WL 486049 at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2008) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment of no
willful infringement in part because, while the infringement suit was still pending, the PTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences issued a non-final order and memorandum rejecting all of the patent's
claims as unpatentable); Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1076,
1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
144. See Informatica, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; Kleen-Tex Indus., 2008 WL 2486363 at *8.
145. See Depomed, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1185; Church & Dwight Co., 2008 WL 2565349 at *10;
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., 2008 WL 2958968 at *2.
146. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App'x 284 (Fed.Cir. 2008).
147. See id. at 291.
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willfulness, however. 148 The link between invalidity arguments raised at
trial and Seagate's threshold question is considered more fully in Part
V.B.4, infra.
Likewise, district courts tend to view credible non-infringement argu-
ments indicate an objectively low likelihood of infringement. 149 At least
one court has found an objectively high likelihood of infringement based in
part on non-infringement arguments that "were not convincing."' 150
The district court in Trading Technologies International v. eSpeed
concluded that knowledge of the plaintiffs pending patent application was
irrelevant in assessing the likelihood of infringement of a valid patent. 151
The court rationalized that "[f]iling an application is no guarantee any pa-
tent will issue and a very substantial percentage of applications never result
in patents."'152 In contrast, Seagate's threshold question limits the objective
inquiry to "a valid patent."153
Finally, one court has held that an earlier Federal Circuit opinion
questioning the validity of certain claims in the plaintiff's patent meant that
the defendant, who was manufacturing and selling a drug covered by one of
the questioned claims, acted with an objectively low likelihood that it was
infringing the patent. 154 Although the earlier appellate case did not involve
the defendant in the instant case, the district court reasoned that if the Fed-
eral Circuit, with exclusive jurisdiction over patent-related appeals, had
serious doubts as to the validity of a specific patent claim, then offering
goods covered by that claim must represent an objectively low likelihood
of infringement of a valid patent. 155
148. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No 07-CV-1 13, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104 at
*28-35 (E.D. Texas Aug. 11, 2009), ajfd 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010 at *62-67 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10,
2010).
149. See Northbrook Digital Corp. v. Browster, Inc., No. 06-4206, 2008 WL 4104695 at **6-7 (D.
Minn. Aug. 26, 2008) (defendant's motion for summary judgment of no willful infringement was
granted in part because of legitimate non-infringement defenses); ResQnet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 533
F. Supp. 2d 397, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding no objectively reckless conduct when the accused
infringer advanced invalidity and non-infringement "arguments [that] were substantial, reasonable, and
far from the sort of easily-dismissed claims that an objectively reckless infringer would be forced to
rely upon"); Franklin Elec. Co., Inc. v. Dover Corp., No. 05-C-598-S, 2008 WL 5067678 at *8 (W.D.
Wis. Nov. 15, 2007) (defendant's motion for summary judgment of no willful infringement was granted
in part because defendant's non-infringement arguments were "significant[ly] support[ed by] the lan-
guage of the patent, the specification and prosecution history").
150. Church & Dwight Co., 2008 WL 2565349 at *10.
151. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 2008 WL 63233 at *1 (N.D. I11. 2008).
152. Id. (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. A.D. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
153. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
154. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 996, 997 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
155. See id. at 999.
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2. Judicial Interpretation of Seagate's Secondary Question: Evidence
Considered in Assessing Whether the Defendant Knew or Should Have
Known of the Objectively High Likelihood that its Conduct Constituted
Infringement
The Federal Circuit has recently stated that evidence of copying and
receipt of marked product sales kits are relevant to the secondary question
under Seagate.156 Only a few district courts have considered Seagate's
secondary question because most of the patentees facing the new standard
have failed to prove that the defendant acted despite an objectively high
risk that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. Thus patterns
of judicial treatment of the secondary question are preliminary at best.
Nonetheless, district courts that have applied the secondary question have
taken a broad view of what evidence shows that "the objectively-defined
risk.. . was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to
the accused infringer."']57
A few courts have recognized that cease and desist letters sent to the
accused infringer may satisfy Seagate's secondary question. 158 For exam-
ple, the district court in Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container v. Limited
Brands found that the patentee met its burden to prove that the infringer
knew of the objectively high likelihood of infringement in part because it
sent a cease and desist letter to the accused infringer.' 59 Similarly, the court
in Church & Dwight denied the infringer's motion for judgment as a matter
of law on the willfulness issue because the patentee introduced evidence
that it sent a cease and desist letter that included a detailed narrative de-
scribing how no plausible non-infringing alternatives could be produced. 160
On the other hand, the district court in TGIP v. AT&T found that two
letters accusing the defendant of infringement were insufficient to justify
the jury's conclusion of willful infringement when the defendant had ob-
tained competent opinion of counsel concluding that the patents were
156. See Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009) ("evidence of copying in a case of direct infringement is relevant only to Seagate's second prong,
as it may show what the accused infringer knew or should have known about the likelihood of its
infringement"); i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010 at *62-66 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 10, 2010) (jury determination of willfulness was supported by evidence that defendant had at-
tended product trainings and received product sales kits marked "patented" with a reference to the
patent-in-suit).
157. In reSeagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
158. See Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-2142, 2008 WL 2565349 at *10 (D.
N.J. Jun. 24, 2008); Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d
939, 954-56 (N.D. Ill. 2008); TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
159. BallAerosol & Specialty Container, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
160. Church & Dwight Co., 2008 WL 2565349 at *10.
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invalid or not infringed. 161 In yet another variation, the District Court of
Minnesota in Northbrook Digital v. Browster viewed the lack of notice
before filing the infringement complaint as an indicator that the infringe-
ment was not willful. 162
District courts have not limited analysis of Seagate's secondary ques-
tion to formal notice of the patent in suit, however. For example, one court
found infringement willful based in part on knowledge the defendant
gained during licensing negotiations with the patentee. 163 Although the
negotiations eventually broke down, the accused infringer used technical
drawings and pricing information shared during the negotiations to design
its own competing product. 164
The court in Church & Dwight reasoned that the accused infringer
knew of the objectively defined risk of infringement based in part on evi-
dence that it tried to secure indemnifications to limit its infringement liabil-
ity exposure and sold off the relevant business unit to avoid infringement
issues. 165
Widespread media publicity of the patent-in-suit and a third party li-
censing agreement were sufficient to satisfy the Seagate standard in De-
pomed v. Ivax Corporation.166 While the court clearly rationalized such
evidence as indicating "that a reasonable party in [the defendant's] position
would have or should have known of the existence of the [patent at issue],"
the court incorrectly analyzed the two Seagate inquiries simultaneously. 167
But the court incorrectly found these facts dispositive-the Seagate stan-
dard asks whether the infringer knew or should have known of the objec-
tively-defined risk of infringement, and not simply of the plaintiffs valid
patent. 168 The appropriate weight to afford evidence of this kind is consi-
dered in Part V.C.5, infra.
Similarly, the Special Master in Veritas Operating v. Microsoft
skipped over Seagate's threshold question and simply stated:
the.., evidence falls well short of raising a genuine issue of material
fact that Microsoft was objectively reckless in making, using, offering to
sell and selling the accused products, or in its communications with its
customers regarding the accused products. [T]here is no dispute that no
161. See TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
162. See Northbrook Digital Corp. v. Browster, Inc., No. 06-4206, 2008 WL 4104695 at *6-7 (D.
Minn. Aug. 26, 2008).
163. See BallAerosol & Specialty Container, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
164. Id.
165. See Church & Dwight Co., 2008 WL 255349 at *10.
166. See Depomed, Inc. v. Ivax Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
167. See id.
168. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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one at Microsoft actually knew of the [patent-in-suit], much less consi-
dered that patent in connection with any commercial activities involving
the accused products. 169
The Depomed court also gave strong weight to the amount of time that
had elapsed between issuance of the plaintiffs patent and the infringing
conduct. 170 But because the court conflated the two separate Seagate inqui-
ries, it is unclear whether this evidence was applied to the threshold ques-
tion, the secondary question, or both. 171 Nonetheless, the court stated that
two years was "ample time [for a reasonable party] to investigate and dis-
cover the relevant patent."'172 Again, this analysis missed the mark Seagate
announced-the inquiry focuses on whether the risk of infringement was
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the defendant. In
contrast, the Depomed court essentially equated the patent itself with the
objective risk of infringement despite the Federal Circuit's palpable efforts
to point out the difference. 73
Knowledge of a pending patent application was relevant-but not dis-
positive-in determining whether the defendant in Trading Technologies
knew or should have known of the risk of infringement. 174 Citing to pre-
Seagate case law, the court admitted that "pre-patent conduct is relevant to
a determination of willfulness,"' 175 but that mere knowledge of a patent
application, without more, is insufficient to satisfy Seagate's secondary
question. 176
With a few exceptions, then, district courts are confused on how to
apply Seagate. They have generally applied arbitrary methodologies incon-
sistent with each other and inconsistent with Seagate's two-part standard.
In addition, courts are unsure what facts are relevant to each prong of the
new willfulness standard. To facilitate the courts' adoption of a willfulness
169. See Veritas Operating Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1286 (W.D. Wash.
2008).
170. Depomed, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
171. The relevant paragraph of the court's opinion begins "[t]here is substantial evidence that
would support the conclusion that Ivax sold Metformin ER despite an objectively high likelihood that
its actions constituted infringement of Depomed's valid patents." But after discussing the evidence, the
same paragraph concludes "[t]his evidence weighs in favor of Depomed's argument that a reasonable
party in Ivax's position would have or should have known of the existence of the '475 patent." Id. at
1185-86.
172. Id. at 1186.
173. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 ("the patentee must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer") (emphasis added).
174. See Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 2008 WL 63233 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
175. Id. at *2 (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
176. Id. at *2.
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test consistent both with the letter and the spirit of Seagate, this note now
considers what evidence may be relevant to each prong of the new stan-
dard.
IV. DISCUSSION: WHAT FACTORS SHOULD A DISTRICT COURT CONSIDER
WHEN FACED WITH A WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT CLAIM AFTER SEAGATE?
Enhanced damages for willful patent infringement are punitive in na-
ture. 177 Punitive damages are assessed in civil cases based on the actor's
culpability.1 78 The Supreme Court stated in State Farm Mutual Insurance
v. Campbell that "punitive damages should only be awarded if the defen-
dant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so repre-
hensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve
punishment or deterrence."' 179
The Supreme Court's punitive damage framework applies to all subs-
tantive divisions of civil law. 180 Dozens of federal courts have relied on
State Farm to analyze a wide array of civil punitive damage awards.1 8 1 In
his concurrence-in-part in Knorr-Bremse, Judge Timothy Dyk cited State
Farm as a guideline for determining whether the Federal Circuit's affirma-
tive duty of care requirement comported with general principles of punitive
damages. 182 Punitive damages for willful patent infringement, therefore,
share a common general purpose and framework with punitive damage
jurisprudence in other areas of civil law.
177. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Underwater Devices,
Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (enhanced damages are punitive
when assessed for willful infringement); In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(noting that the Underwater Devices standard "allows for punitive damages in a manner inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent").
178. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
179. Id.
180. See AM. BAR ASS'N, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BuSINESS TORTS 2 (Thomas J. Collin, ed.
1998) ("As a general proposition, punitive damages are damages awarded to punish a person for ex-
treme or outrageous acts").
181. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Morgan, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007) (breach of non-
compete agreement and tortious interference with contract); Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 486 F.3d
150 (6th Cir. 2007) (violation of Fair Credit Reporting Act); Action Marine, Inc. v. Continental Carbon,
Inc., 481 F.3d 1302 (1lth Cir. 2007) (common law nuisance and trespass from noxious carbon black
emissions); Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (civil rights violation
under § 1983); White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004) (Title VII
action); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004) (federal RICO violations in fraudu-
lent loan applications); Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2004) (medical
malpractice).
182. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337, 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
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In Seagate, the Federal Circuit expressly sought to realign willfulness
in patent infringement with willfulness in other areas of civil liability. 183
Because punitive damages serve to punish and deter culpable conduct,
factors relevant for proving objective recklessness in other areas of non-
criminal law are instructive in building a concrete test for the new standard
after Seagate. Considering the policy goals driving patent law, comparable
areas of civil liability, and preliminary judicial interpretations of the new
standard, a set of factors for analyzing an infringer's conduct emerges.
A. Are the Bott and Read Factors Still Relevant?
The Bott and Read Factors were developed under a subjective willful-
ness standard. 184 Their continued validity as a comprehensive test for will-
fulness after Seagate is therefore suspect, and some district courts have
already questioned their relevency.185 The Seagate opinion itself strongly
suggests that the Federal Circuit no longer considers them determinative. 186
While the court did not expressly abrogate the existing Factors, it invited
future courts to "further develop the application of this standard," implying
that the willfulness analysis should not include the Bott and Read Fac-
tors.187 In addition, court-led development would be logically unnecessary
if the Bott and Read Factors were still adequate to assess a defendant's
conduct under the new objective recklessness standard.
Specifically, two of the three Bott Factors expressly consider the in-
fringer's subjective state of mind. But the Federal Circuit clearly stated in
Seagate that "[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to
this objective inquiry." 188 The third Bott Factor considers the infringer's
conduct during litigation, and is therefore irrelevant in assessing the pros-
pective risk that its planned conduct may infringe a valid patent.
One of the Read Factors considers whether the defendant had a "moti-
vation for harm"-a subjective inquiry into the accused infringer's state of
mind. 189 The remainder of the Read Factors primarily guide the district
courts in deciding how much to enhance damages-not whether enhance-
183. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that willfulness in
patent infringement "fails to comport with the general understanding of willfulness in the civil context")
(citing McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988)).
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See Depomed, Inc. v. Ivax Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Informatica
Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1082-83 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
186. See In reSeagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1370-71.
187. Id. at 1371.
188. Id.
189. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Am. Safety Table Co. v.
Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1979)).
[Vol 84:3
WILLFUL PA TENT INFRINGEMENT
ment is authorized. 190 But under Seagate such an inquiry is not necessary
until the patentee proves the infringer acted willfully. Thus while the Bott
and Read Factors are no longer appropriate in assessing the objective reck-
lessness of the infringer's conduct, district courts may still find them useful
in gauging the extent of damage enhancement once willfulness under Sea-
gate has been determined. 191
Traditionally, an assessment of an infringer's allegedly willful conduct
has been based on the "totality of the circumstances" standard. 192 There is
no indication in Seagate's majority opinion that would suggest that the
Federal Circuit altered the scope of that inquiry. Indeed, Judge Newman's
concurring opinion implies that the scope of the willfulness inquiry should
still consider all available circumstances. 193 Accordingly, any set of dis-
crete factors for gauging an infringer's willful conduct will necessarily fall
short of "exhaustive." Thus, in addition to the Proposed Factors presented
below, courts should consider any additional evidence relevant to the two-
part willfulness test. 194
B. Assessing the Threshold Question: What Factors Show an "Objective-
ly High Likelihood" that the Defendant's Conduct Would Infringe Anoth-
er's Valid Patent?
The threshold question asks whether the defendant "acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a
valid patent." 195 In other words, a patentee must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that its valid patent claimed an invention so close to the
defendant's conduct that the probability that such conduct infringed the
190. Id. (noting that the factors are useful "particularly in deciding on the extent of [damage]
enhancement").
191. At least one district court has considered the Read Factors in determining the extent of damage
enhancement under Seagate. See Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 527
F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1082-83 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
192. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 33, at 82.
193. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., concurring
opinion) (The standards of behavior by which a possible infringer evaluates adverse patents
should.., include [the] reasonableness of the actions taken in the particular circumstances.") (empha-
sis added). But see Depomed, Inc. v. Ivax Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("It is
unsettled whether the Federal Circuit's prior 'totality of the circumstances' test is now abrogated ....").
194. For example, one of the four factors courts in the Fourth Circuit consider when presented with
a claim for willful copyright infringement is "any other relevant factor presented." Rosciszewski v.
Arete Assoc., Inc., I F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 155-
56 (3d Cir. 1986)).
195. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (noting that, in general, "the civil law generally calls a
person reckless who acts.., in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so
obvious that it should be known.") (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994), which in
turn cites Prosser & Keaton § 34, pp. 213-14; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965) (emphasis
added)).
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patent was objectively high. 196 Evidence as to the nature of the defendant's
conduct before and while engaging in the allegedly infringing activities are
thus relevant. 197 The objective recklessness standard was adopted to bring
patent jurisprudence in line with other areas of tort law. 198 Factors relevant
to the threshold question, therefore, can be compiled by analogizing to
other areas of tort law similarly concerned with an actor's objectively reck-
less conduct.
Proposed Threshold Factor 1. Similarity of the patented invention to the
defendant's infringing conduct.
The risk that conduct will infringe a patent is highest when the activity
precisely matches the claimed invention. 199 Conversely, the risk is lowest
when the conduct and the patented invention bear no relation at all. Thus,
the most important factor in assessing the risk of infringement is to deter-
mine how similar the defendant's conduct is to the patented invention.
The majority opinion in Seagate indirectly supports this principle: The
court noted that patentees can guard against post-filing willful infringement
by moving for a preliminary injunction.200 If the district court denies the
motion for preliminary injunction, it is unlikely that the post-filing infring-
ing conduct was willful. 20 1 In other words, "[a] substantial question
about ... infringement is likely sufficient not only to avoid a preliminary
injunction, but also a charge of willfulness based on post-litigation con-
duct." 202
As for pre-litigation conduct, evidence that the defendant attempted to
secure rights in the technology or design around the patent at issue is
probative because it suggests that the patented technology and the defen-
dant's intended conduct were substantially similar. First, evidence that the
defendant filed a patent application on the technology suggests that it con-
sidered its innovation to be distinct from the patentee's rights. 20 3 Under the
Patent Act, an inventor can only be awarded a patent if his invention is,
196. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
197. See id. at 1374 ("in ordinary circumstances, willfulness will depend on an infringer's prelitiga-
tion conduct").
198. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
199. See generally William W. Cochran II, Review of Selected Cases from the CAFC Relating to
Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents and Literal Infringement Under Paragraph 6, 35 USC
112, 29 IDEA 253 (1989).
200. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1374.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. This assumes, of course, that the defendant filed its application in compliance with the PTO's
guideline that applicants provide copies of all relevant prior art to the examiner for consideration.
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inter alia, novel.204 If the defendant's application was rejected for lack of
novelty, the objective risk that future activity utilizing that technology will
infringe another's patent rights is extremely high because another inventor
already secured rights in that same technology through a U.S. patent.205
Similarly, evidence that the patentee's invention was involved in an interfe-
rence proceeding206 with the defendant's patent application strongly sug-
gests that the defendant's conduct was very similar to the patented
invention.
Second, evidence that the defendant tried in vain to license rights from
the patentee strongly suggests that subsequent conduct in the same field
would be highly likely to infringe. 207 If the defendant failed to secure rights
in the patent at issue, but then proceeded to use the unlicensed technology
anyway, courts may justifiably conclude that the objective risk of infringe-
ment was high.
Evidence of the defendant's efforts to design around the claims of a
patent presents a challenging situation in light of the new objective stan-
dard. The U.S. patent system seeks in part to encourage inventors to design
multiple solutions to a given problem. 208 The public receives the benefit of
choice in available goods and services, competitors are not completely
boxed out of a market niche by losing the race to invent "the" solution to a
given problem, and competition within that market niche is thus fos-
tered.209
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Novelty is a term of art that limits patent awards to inventors in
several ways. The limitations most relevant to an inquiry into the objective risk that a defendant's
conduct may infringe a valid patent are found in §§ 102(a) and (g). The Patent Office will reject an
application for patent when the invention has already been patented by someone else in the United
States. And under § 102(g), an applicant may be denied a patent in favor of another applicant who
actually invented the technology first.
205. A rejection for lack of novelty may also be strong evidence that the defendant knew or should
have known of the objectively high risk that his conduct would infringe another's patent rights, a topic
discussed further in Part IV.B., infra.
206. Interference proceedings are conducted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
when two patent applications, or one application and one issued, unexpired patent, both claim the same
invention. The interference proceeding determines which applicant invented the technology first and
will therefore receive the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 135. See also ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 118 (2d ed. 2004).
207. See Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 939,
954 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Cf King Inst. Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
208. See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court stated:
One of the benefits of a patent system is its so called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a
competitor's products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innova-
tions to the marketplace. It should not be discouraged by punitive damage awards except in
cases where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for them.
Id. at 1236.
209. See Holbrook, supra note 9, at 131 (citing Federal Circuit case law acknowledging that the
U.S. patent system encourages a patentee's competitors to "design around" existing patents).
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But a purely objective inquiry--one that ignores relevant policy goals
of the patent system-may well view design-around activity as a clear indi-
cator that the defendant's conduct was close enough to the patented inven-
tion that the risk of infringement was objectively high. If the patent's claim
scope and the defendant's conduct were dissimilar, after all, design-around
efforts would be unnecessary. Considering that willfulness is only a rele-
vant inquiry once actual infringement is proven, however, evidence of de-
sign-around activity merely indicates a subjective intent to try to avoid
infringement liability. While Seagate clearly dismissed subjective intent as
a relevant factor, it is also clear that the Federal Circuit did not endeavor to
undermine the patent system's policy rationales.
Indeed the Federal Circuit has previously favored the policy goal of
encouraging design-around efforts over punitive damage interests. 210 Ap-
plying the pre-Seagate subjective willfulness standard in Westvaco v. In-
ternational Paper, the court reversed a district court finding that Westvaco
willfully infringed International Paper's patents, stating that design-around
efforts "should not be discouraged by punitive damage awards except in
cases where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for them."'21'
A bright line rule exempting all infringers from enhanced damage
awards upon a showing of design-around activities is therefore inappro-
priate. One recent Federal Circuit decision supports the view that evidence
demonstrating the defendant's efforts to avoid infringement by designing
around a patented product is relevant to the threshold question.212 Evidence
of the specific design-around steps is therefore relevant to determine
whether, for example, the accused infringer "made specific structural
changes to its product ... to avoid infringement. '2 13
Proposed Threshold Factor 2. Opinion of counsel obtained by the defendant
before engaging in the conduct at issue.
Despite the Federal Circuit's rejection in Knorr-Bremse of the adverse
inference drawn from failure to obtain an opinion of counsel, corporate
actors still find such opinions useful in assessing the risk a proposed course
of action may bring on the company. 214 Generally, opinions of counsel
210. See Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
211. Id. (quoting State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1235-36).
212. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2009-1504, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 10, 2010).
213. Id.
214. See Alejandro Menchaca, Shareholder, McAndrews Held & Malloy, Ltd., Presentation at the
52d Annual Intellectual Property Law Conference: Recent Developments in Patent, Trademark, Copy-
right & Trade Secret Law (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author).
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analyze the client's proposed conduct in light of issued patents covering
similar technologies or processes. The opinion typically considers three
independent questions: (1) whether the existing patent is valid, (2) whether
the existing patent is enforceable, and (3) whether the proposed conduct is
so similar to the rights secured by the patent to be considered infringement.
The conclusions are relevant in determining the objective level of risk that
the proposed conduct would infringe another's patent because they
represent the unbiased assessments of a patent professional.
For example, an opinion concluding that the patent at issue was valid,
enforceable, and the defendant's proposed conduct would likely infringe
the scope of the patent's claims clearly establishes an objectively high like-
lihood that the proposed conduct would infringe. Of course, a defendant is
not likely to rely on such an opinion to defend against a claim of willful
infringement, and under Knorr-Bremse, a fact finder may no longer draw
an adverse inference from a defendant's choice not to rely on an opinion.
But should an opinion like this find its way into evidence, a court should
conclude the objective risk of infringement was high.
More likely is the case where the defendant relies on an opinion con-
cluding that the plaintiffs patent is invalid, unenforceable, and that the
defendant's proposed conduct is not likely to infringe a valid and enforcea-
ble patent. Presuming such an opinion is an objective assessment of the
scope of the patent and the defendant's proposed course of action,215 evi-
dence of this nature strongly suggests that the risk that the defendant's con-
duct may infringe the patent was objectively low.
Courts are also likely to encounter opinions of counsel that raise se-
rious questions as to the patent's validity. Such evidence indicates an ob-
jectively low likelihood of infringement after Seagate because the standard
considers the level of risk of infringing "a valid patent. '216 When the con-
duct encroaches on the claims of an invalid patent, therefore, the risk must
be low because patent law provides no protection for inventions in the pub-
lic domain. 217
215. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
216. In reSeagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
217. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Moleculon Res. Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793
F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Safoco, Inc. v. Cameron Int'l Corp., No. H-05-0739, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at *63-77 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2009) (reexamination of patent-in-suit suggests the lack of an
objectively high risk of infringement, but is not dispositive); St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v.
Matsushita Elec. Tndus. Co., Ltd, No. 04-1436, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66359 at *7-9 (D. Del. July 28,
2009).
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The Federal Circuit recently endorsed a similar view in Black &
Decker, one of the first cases involving willfulness to reach the appellate
court after Seagate.218 Although the willfulness issue was moot after the
court reversed the district court's claim construction, the circuit noted that
"credible invalidity arguments demonstrate the lack of an objectively high
likelihood that a party took actions constituting infringement of a valid
patent. '219 Should credible invalidity arguments appear in an opinion of
counsel, therefore, the risk of infringement is objective low.
For similar reasons, an opinion of counsel concluding that the patent
at issue is unenforceable also indicates an objectively low risk of infringe-
ment. Again, the Seagate standard only considers the risk of infringement
of "a valid patent."220 While judicial findings of unenforceability are rela-
tively rare,221 an infringer's reliance on a competent opinion of counsel
clearly proffering persuasive evidence of unenforceability should not be
considered per se unreasonable. 222
In sum, a competent pre-litigation opinion that concludes that the risk
of infringement is low, raises credible invalidity arguments, or lays out
strong evidence of unenforceability strongly suggests that the objective
likelihood of infringement is low. On the other hand, an opinion that con-
cludes that the risk of infringement is high, raises weak or strained invalidi-
ty arguments, or uncovers no evidence of unenforceability strongly
suggests that the objective likelihood of infringement is high.
Proposed Threshold Factor 3. Characteristics of the defendant's commer-
cial market including patent saturation and the pace of innovation.
Because Seagate prescribes an objective standard, the inquiry must
consider the reasonableness of the infringer's conduct compared to similar-
ly situated actors. Reasonable conduct in one industry may not be the same
as reasonable conduct in another industry.223 Judge Newman suggested that
218. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App'x 284, 291 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
219. Id.
220. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F,3d at 1371.
221. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp, 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing
the assertion of the unenforceability by inequitable conduct defense in patent infringement litigation as
"an absolute plague" and noting that the defense is meritless except for "a small percentage of the
cases").
222. But see John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988).
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) ("An actor's
compliance with the custom of the community, or of others in like circumstances, is evidence that the
actor's conduct is not negligent but does not preclude a finding of negligence."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 13(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) ("An actor's departure from the custom of
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the "standards of fair commerce, including [the] reasonableness of the ac-
tions taken in the particular circumstances" are relevant to the new objec-
tive willfulness inquiry. 224 Taking cue from her concurring opinion, 225 two
sub-factors examining the specific field of technology at issue in the litiga-
tion fine-tune this inquiry.
One objective measure of the risk that activity may infringe is the lev-
el of patent saturation in the relevant field. When patenting innovation is
commonplace in the relevant market, then the risk of infringing another's
patent in that market is objectively higher than for a distinct market where
patents are rarely obtained. Additionally, a large number of patents on
components used in the relevant market may suggest that infringement in
that field is almost per se likely. Marketable devices unique to that field
that necessarily require use of those patented components increases the risk
of infringement for any actor in that field.
A second objective gauge of the risk of infringement is the pace of in-
novation in that field. For example, a defendant active in a market with a
high rate of innovation is more likely to engage in infringing conduct be-
cause the number of patents issued in that field increases rapidly. While
rapid innovation also indicates that patentable inventions are easier to de-
velop than in a slow-innovating field, a defendant actively involved in a
rapidly advancing industry is simply competing with a larger number of
inventors for a limited number of possible innovations. The objective risk
of overlapping conduct in a fast-growing industry is therefore higher than
in a slow-developing market.
Patent saturation and innovation pace are essentially qualitative in na-
ture. But basic statistical data may be available from publicly available
market sales and marketing reports, industry trade publications, popular
media, or even the United States Patent Office web site.
Proposed Threshold Factor 4. Legitimate defenses to infringement raised at
trial.
The Federal Circuit remanded the Black & Decker infringement ver-
dict against Bosch on claim construction grounds. 226 But because the dis-
trict court would also have to rehear the infringement and willful
infringement issues based on the modified claim construction, the Federal
the community, or of others in like circumstances, in a way that increases risk is evidence of the actor's
negligence but does not require a finding of negligence").
224. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).
225. See id. at 1384-85.
226. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App'x 284, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Circuit noted in dicta that "legitimate defenses to infringement
claims.., demonstrate the lack of an objectively high likelihood that a
party took actions constituting infringement of a valid patent.227
This statement presents an interesting chronological conundrum. On
the one hand, legitimate infringement defenses are only raised at trial when
the party's conduct is in question by the patentee. But the willfulness stan-
dard set forth in Seagate considers the objective risk of infringement when
the defendant began its infringing conduct-long before any threats of
litigation by the parties. Did the Federal Circuit intend to incorporate litiga-
tion conduct into the willful infringement inquiry?
A better explanation is that the court was addressing two separate is-
sues simultaneously. Black & Decker, the prevailing patentee at the district
court, was awarded damage enhancement based on the jury's finding of
willful infringement on Bosch's part, and also moved for attorneys' fees
under Section 285.228 Reasonable attorneys' fees can be awarded to a pre-
vailing patentee when the case is "exceptional. '229 Courts have long held
that a finding of willful infringement is sufficient for determining that a
case is "exceptional. '230 The district court explicitly discussed willfulness
as sufficient to awarding attorneys' fees, and went so far as to consider
Bosch's litigation conduct under the Bott and Read Factor analysis for will-
fulness. The district court in Black & Decker ultimately concluded that
Bosch's litigation conduct was not sufficiently in bad faith to award attor-
neys' fees, but that it, in combination with the other factors, justified en-
hancement of the damages. 231 Thus it is possible that the Federal Circuit
was simultaneously responding to the relevancy of litigation conduct in
both the willfulness and fee-shifting provisions of the Patent Act.
District Courts have split on the relevance of invalidity and nonin-
fringement arguments raised solely at trial. Some find the evidence relevant
to the threshold question. 232 Others reject this approach because the rele-
227. Id. at 291.
228. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party").
229. Id.
230. See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[a]n
express finding of willful infringement is a sufficient basis for classifying a case as exceptional"')
(quoting Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed.Cir. 1990)).
231. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3359349 at
*5, 10 (N.D. Il1. 2006).
232. See. e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 397, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Depuy
Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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vant time period is not during trial, but during the allegedly infringing con-
duct.2 33
Because of the difficulties in chronology, however, the better position
is that legitimate defenses raised at trial are irrelevant to an objective will-
fulness inquiry under the Seagate standard. Of course, legitimate defenses
raised at trial may still be relevant to the willfulness inquiry, especially
when the defendant engaged in its allegedly infringing behavior with such a
defense already in hand.234 Nonetheless, until the Federal Circuit clarifies
its position on their proper role, defenses raised at trial against infringement
seem to be relevant to the threshold question.235
C. Assessing Seagate's Secondary Question: What Factors Show that the
Risk of Infringement was Either Known or So Obvious that it Should Have
Been Known?
Once a patentee has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
risk of infringement was objectively high, he must also prove "that this
objectively-defined risk... was either known or so obvious that it should
have been known to the accused infringer. '236 Mere awareness of the pa-
tent at issue is not sufficient to satisfy this second prong because the stan-
dard refers to the objectively high risk of infringement, not the risk that a
valid patent exists. 237 The Seagate court relied on Prosser and Keeton's
classic torts treatise and the Second Restatement of Torts when crafting this
second prong.238 Accordingly, establishing appropriate factors for assess-
ing whether the infringer knew or should have known of the risk his con-
duct may infringe may be derived from comparable areas of tort law.
233. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2009-1504, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010 at *66-67
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
234. See supra Part IV.B.2.
235. See Black & Decker, 260 F. App'x at 291. Although Black & Decker is a non-precedential
opinion, several district courts have relied on it when applying Seagate. See, e.g., Kleen-Tex Indus.,
Inc. v. Mountville Mills, Inc., No. 3:03-CV-093-JTC, 2008 WL 2486363 at *8 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2008);
Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., No. 8:07CV70, 2008 WL 3875299 at *1 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2008).
236. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
237. See id.
238. See id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). In Farmer, the Supreme Court
noted the difference between civil and criminal recklessness in deciding whether a transsexual inmate's
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment was violated by prison officials that
failed to protect him from harm at the hands of other inmates. In distinguishing civil and criminal
recklessness, the Court cited Prosser and Keeton and the Second Restatement of Torts for the proposi-
tion that civil recklessness does not require actual knowledge by a tortfeasor, but that the unjustifiably
high risk of harm must either be "known or [is] so obvious that it should be known. Id. at 836. Ultimate-
ly, the Court held that Farmer's Eighth Amendment claim was governed by the subjective criminal
recklessness standard. Id. at 837.
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Proposed Secondary Factor 1. Evidence that the patentee provided clear
notice that the defendant's specific conduct will infringe his issued patent.
Before Seagate, actual knowledge of the patent was generally disposi-
tive of the willfulness issue because knowledge triggered the affirmative
duty to exercise due care to avoid infringement. 239 Although the affirma-
tive duty to exercise due care was abrogated, Seagate somewhat restored
the importance of actual knowledge in the new standard. But the court was
careful to point out that actual knowledge of the patent is not dispositive in
the post-Seagate world. Instead, willfulness is shown only when "the pa-
tentee demonstrate[s] that [the] objectively-defined risk (determined by the
record developed in the infringement proceeding) was... known. '240
Knowledge of the patent at issue should remain a critically important
factor in the Seagate analysis, however, because such knowledge may
create an inference that the defendant knew or should have known of the
risk of infringement. Conversely, proving an infringer should have known
of the risk that he would infringe the patent at issue becomes very diffi-
cult-if not impossible-if the defendant had no knowledge of the patent at
all.
An understanding of the importance of actual knowledge of the patent
at issue may be informed by looking to an analogous situation governed by
federal copyright law. The constitution's Intellectual Property Clause
granted Congress the authority to regulate both patent and copyright poli-
cy. 24 1 While substantive provisions differ between the two areas, the poli-
cies underlying each have similar overtones because of their common
239. In Imonex Services v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner, the Federal Circuit summarized the
pre-Seagate willfulness standard:
Actual notice of another's patent rights triggers an affirmative duty of due care. Constructive
notice, as by marking a product with a patent number, is insufficient to trigger this duty. This
court has identified several criteria for assessing damages, including, inter alia, whether the
infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent
and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed, and the duration
of defendant's misconduct.
408 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The court concluded that willfulness
in the Imonex case turned on whether the defendants had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's patent
because none of the defendants had obtained an opinion of counsel until after the infringement suit was
filed. Id. at 1377-78. Evidence that the patentee marked its products, passed out marketing material that
pointed out the products' patent protection, and even communicated with the defendants about unautho-
rized use of the patented products before filing suit. Id. at 1378. The court concluded that the defendants
indeed had actual knowledge of the patents and affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants'
motion for JMOL on the willfulness issue. Id.
240. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (emphasis added).
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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constitutional roots.242 As is the case for patent law, enhanced damages in
copyright infringement cases are available when the defendant willfully
infringes the copyrighted material.2 43 Unlike patent law, however, copy-
right infringement requires the plaintiff to prove either direct copying or
access to the copyrighted material plus a substantial similarity between the
copyrighted and infringing material. 244 But like the new objective reckless-
ness standard announced in Seagate, willful copyright infringement can be
shown "where the defendant knows that its conduct is an infringement or is
reckless in not knowing that fact. ' 245 Courts have held that "evidence of
notice ... before the specific acts found to have constituted copyright in-
fringement occurred is perhaps the most persuasive evidence of willful-
ness."
2 4 6
In the copyright context, a non-specific cease and desist letter is gen-
erally insufficient notice to support a willfulness finding.247 Similarly, a
mere showing that the patentee sent the defendant a vague cease and desist
letter should be insufficient by itself to satisfy the second Seagate prong.
Rather, a cease and desist letter should at least include identification of the
patent at issue and a detailed description of the allegedly infringing con-
duct.
The Federal Circuit noted in Seagate that post-filing conduct is gener-
ally less probative than pre-litigation conduct. 248 Accordingly, filing suit
against the defendant alleging infringement should not be dispositive of
Seagate's second prong, especially as to the defendant's pre-litigation con-
duct. Likewise, simple notice pleading of willfulness in the complaint
242. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201-04 (2003) .(analogizing an issue of copyright
term extension legislation to similar regulation in patent law); see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510
U.S. 517, 525 n.12 (1994) (interpreting the fee-shifting provision in the Copyright Act in light of the
fee-shifting provision in the Patent Act and the Lanham Act because copyright, trademark, and patent
law are "related").
243. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). See also, e.g., Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Tax-
idermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996); Video Views, Inc. v. Sudio 21, Ltd., 925
F.2d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 (1991).
244. See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property § 225 (2004).
245. Video Views, 925 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis added). In Video Views, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling that the defendant infringed Video Views' copyrights for adult films, and also
affirmed the court's finding that the plaintiff's claim for willful infringement was unsupported by the
evidence. Video Views premised its claim for willful copyright infringement exclusively on evidence
that it notified the accused infringer of its copyrights in films produced by a list of twelve companies.
The two films shown to the public by the defendant were not produced by any of the companies listed
in Video Views' notice letter.
246. Id. at 1021.
.247. See id.
248. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An obvious exception to this
general rule is when the defendant continues to infringe the plaintiff's patent after the complaint is filed.
See id.
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should not support a willfulness allegation as to the defendant's post-
complaint conduct. Cease and desist letters should set forth more than a de
minimis statement that the recipient may be infringing one or more issued
patents for this first Proposed Secondary Factor to favor the patentee.
Proposed Secondary Factor 2. Opinion of counsel obtained by the defen-
dant before engaging in the conduct at issue.
Evidence that the defendant knew or should have known of the objec-
tively high risk that its conduct would infringe the patent at issue may also
come from an opinion of counsel. Opinions of counsel generally include
thorough assessments of the likelihood that the client's proposed conduct
will infringe an issued patent. 249After Knorr-Bremse and Seagate, howev-
er, defendants are not required to obtain such an opinion nor will the court
draw a negative inference from the defendant's choice not to rely on such
an opinion.250 But if such evidence is offered to defend against infringe-
ment, it is also useful to determine whether the defendant knew or should
have known that its conduct was likely to infringe.
First, an opinion of counsel can only show that the defendant knew or
should have known of the risk if it is effectively communicated to the de-
fendant.251 Effective communication of an opinion to the client is critical
because the enhanced damages provision seeks to punish culpable con-
duct.252 This purpose is not advanced if culpability is based on the contents
of an opinion of counsel that is not effectively communicated to the defen-
dant. In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing v. Johnson & Johnson Ortho-
paedics,253 the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court finding of
willfulness in part because the opinion of invalidity was rendered to the
defendant orally, rather than in writing.254 An oral opinion poses eviden-
tiary problems for subsequent litigation, which typically does not occur for
years after the opinion is rendered; these problems are of course solved by
a written opinion.255 But Minnesota Mining is clear that orally rendered
opinions are not per se unreliable. Thus, if an opinion of counsel represents
the sole basis for finding an objectively high risk of infringement in a par-
249. Questions typically addressed in opinions of counsel are discussed in Part IV.B.2., supra.
250. See supra Part I.A.
251. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (questioning the value of an opinion of invalidity because it was communi-
cated orally to the client).
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
253. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 976 F.2d at 1580.
254. Id. (noting that "oral opinions are not favored" and therefore "carry less weight").
255. Id.
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ticular case, then the infringer could only have known of that high risk if
the opinion is effectively communicated, preferably in writing.
The question of whether an infringer's failure to obtain an opinion of
counsel before engaging in conduct satisfies Seagate's alternative "should
have known" option presents a bigger challenge. While a court is no longer
permitted to determine willfulness exclusively based on a defendant's fail-
ure to seek legal advice, 256 a comprehensive analysis of the totality of the
circumstances should not wholly ignore such evidence. 257
Again considering an analogous situation in the copyright context
guides analysis of this Factor. Like in the patent context, accused copyright
infringers are not duty-bound to seek advice of counsel upon receiving
notice of possible infringement. But two federal appellate courts have cited
a defendant's failure to obtain legal advice as a significant indication that
the copyright infringement was willful. 258
Therefore, while evidence that the infringer obtained an opinion of
counsel suggests he actually knew of the objective risk of infringement,
evidence that the infringer failed to obtain an opinion of counsel may still
indicate that he should have known of the objectively high risk. Because
the conclusions in any opinion define the risk of infringement under the
first prong, this Factor ultimately hinges on the nature of those conclusions.
Proposed Secondary Factor 3. Special relationship between the patentee
and the defendant.
Evidence that the infringer was in a contractual relationship with the
patentee, was an independent contractor of the patentee, or was a former
employer of the patentee may indicate that he knew or should have known
about the patent at issue-and perhaps of the objectively high risk of in-
fringement, too. In i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft, for example, Mi-
crosoft's infringement was found to be willful based in part on evidence
that the patentee demonstrated the patented software, provided sales kits
marked with the patent number, and sent marketing emails to Microsoft
employees before Microsoft began developing its competing software
product. 259
256. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344; In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
257. 1 am especially grateful to Alejandro Menchaca for helpful discussions on this topic. See also
Menchaca, supra note 214.
258. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); Wildlife Ex-
press Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 512 (7th Cir. 1994).
259. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2009-1504, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS at *64-65 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
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Additional support for this Factor is found in trade secrets law. 260
Specifically, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure permits a plaintiff to en-
join a defendant that has entered into a relationship whereby disclosure of
the plaintiffs trade secret is practically unavoidable, regardless of the de-
fendant's intent.261 The doctrine recognizes that an individual formerly in a
special relationship with the trade secret owner-typically an ex-employee
and his former employer-knew of the trade secrets, or at the very least
should have known of the trade secrets because of his former role.262
Likewise, general principles of agency law prohibit agents from using
the principal's confidential information for the agent's own gain.263 In
Western Medical Consultants v. Johnson,264 the Ninth Circuit held that a
former employee did not breach her non-compete agreement because she
had no reason to know that her former employer had plans to open a com-
peting office before she opened shop in Alaska. 265
Inherent in the court's reasoning, however, is the notion that Johnson
would have been in breach of the agreement even if she merely "should
have known" about her former employer's plans to open an Alaskan of-
fice.266 By analogy, then, evidence of a special relationship between the
patentee and the defendant, including employment, contractual, fiduciary,
or even familial relationships, may be relevant in determining whether the
defendant knew or should have known about the patent at issue.
This Factor requires a court to additionally consider the specific scope
of the infringer's relationship with the patentee because the infringer may
have had limited or no access to information concerning the patent at issue.
For example, evidence that the defendant licensed the patent at issue from
the plaintiff is evidence that the defendant actually knew of the patent, or at
the very least should have known that its own conduct similar to that
260. Trade secrets law lies at the crossroads of various legal regimes including contract law, torts,
criminal law, unfair competition, agency law, and more. Most states have enacted some version of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a model code that defines a trade secret
as information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, tech-
nique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other per-
sons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of ef-
forts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985).
261. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995). See generally JAMES
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 7.02[2][b][ii] (updated 2008).
262. See Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1268.
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006).
264. Western Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 1996).
265. See id. at 1336.
266. See id. at 1335.
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claimed in the patent may infringe.267 But evidence that the patentee hired
the defendant as an independent contractor for a short-term project wholly
unrelated to the patents is significantly less persuasive.
More difficult is the situation where the defendant has licensed rights
from the plaintiff that are dissimilar from the infringed patent. The defen-
dant should have known of the risk of infringement when the licensed pa-
tent is very similar to the infringed patent-for example when both patents
cover similar technologies. But evidence that the licensed patent covers
technology dissimilar to the infringed patent may suggest that the defen-
dant had no reasonable basis for knowing its conduct would infringe the
dissimilar patent.
Proposed Secondary Factor 4. The defendant's level of skill compared to a
person having ordinary skill in the art.
One of the statutory requirements for patentability is that the invention
be "non-obvious" to "a person having ordinary skill in the art."'268 While
the ordinary level of skill in the art objectively determines the eligibility of
an invention for patent protection under the statute, the same level of ordi-
nary skill is useful in objectively determining the level of sophistication of
the accused infringer. The defendant's level of sophistication, in turn, can
be useful in determining whether it "should have known" of the risk it may
be infringing another's patent.269
In seeking to punish culpable behavior in developing innovation,
courts should exercise care to avoid over-deterring unsophisticated actors
lest the fear of treble damages dissuade businesses from engaging in new
competitive projects in the first place. The second Seagate prong must
therefore consider the defendant's level of sophistication to determine what
he "should have known" at the time of the allegedly infringing activities.
When the accused infringer possesses much lower skill than a person
having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSITA"), it is less likely that he knew
or should have known his conduct was infringing. This is likely true, for
example, when the patent at issue is outside the defendant's normal com-
mercial market.270 If the defendant engaged in conduct within his own
267. Cf Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 939, 954
(N.D. I1. 2008).
268. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
269. The defendant's level of sophistication is not relevant to whether it infringed the patent be-
cause infringement is a strict liability tort. See supra, Part I.
270. Judge Newman's concurring opinion in Seagate seems to support this assertion: "[T]o the
extent that Underwater Devices has been applied as a per se rule that every possibly related patent must
be exhaustively studied by expensive legal talent, lest infringement presumptively incur treble damages,
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market that infringes a patent in a different market or technological field, it
is unlikely that the defendant had actual knowledge of the patent--or that
the risk of infringing that patent was so obvious that he should have known
about it. Even if the defendant has a level of skill similar to a PHOSITA in
his own field, the level of skill he possesses in the patentee's field may be
substantially less. Because willful infringement awards are a form of puni-
tive damages, 271 courts should be reluctant to punish a defendant who in-
fringes a patent outside his normal commercial market without additional
evidence that he actually knew of the high risk of infringement.
On the other hand, an accused infringer possessing skill significantly
greater than a PHOSITA is more likely to know of the patent. But again,
the relevant inquiry is whether the infringer knew or should have known of
the risk of infringement-not just of the patent itself.272 Unless the accused
infringer is also sophisticated as to patent law, therefore, a court should be
reluctant to view this Proposed Factor as dispositive of Seagate's second
prong. Nonetheless, a finding that the defendant is significantly more
skilled than a PHOSITA in the patentee's field favors the patentee.
Proposed Secondary Factor 5. Contemporary media publicity of the paten-
tee or its patent.
Seagate held that willful infringement requires proof that the infringer
knew or should have known about the risk that his conduct infringes a valid
patent. Constructive knowledge of the patent is nonetheless an important
consideration.
Besides actual notice obtained directly from the patentee, 273 the de-
fendant may learn about the patent at issue through other means, including
contemporary media outlets. If coverage of the patent is pervasive enough,
a fact-finder may justifiably conclude that the defendant should have
known about the patent and therefore the risk that his conduct would in-
fringe the patentee's rights.
Publicity of the patentee or its patent may take many forms. For ex-
ample, the New York Times published a 1,300-word article on the front
page of its Business section discussing the ramifications of a patent
I agree that the standard should be modified." In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1385 (Newman, J.,
concurring).
271. See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1853) (interpreting the 1836 modifi-
cations to the Patent Act as distinguishing between actual damages, which are meant to compensate the
patentee for losses sustained as a result of the infringement, and discretionary damages, which are
meant to punish the "wanton and malicious pirate" for bad faith infringement).
272. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
273. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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awarded to Priceline.com covering its "buyer-driven commerce" business
plan.274 Such prominent placement and thorough discussion of the patent in
a widely circulated periodical would support an overall finding that other
online retailers should have known that similar activity would likely in-
fringe Priceline's patent rights.
Similarly, publication of issued patents in an industry-specific periodi-
cal may also support an overall conclusion that the defendant should have
known of the risk that its conduct would infringe patented technology. For
example, Organic Process Research and Development routinely publishes
reviews of selected recently-issued patents in technical fields of interest to
its readers. 275 Thus, proof that the defendant subscribes to the industry-
specific publication where news of the plaintiffs patent was published
strongly suggests that the defendant knew or should have known that com-
mencing activity similar to that described in the periodical would likely
infringe the patent.
Lectures and exhibits at major industry trade shows, widespread pub-
lication of relevant license agreements to third parties; infringement suits,
settlements, and verdicts against others; and assignment of the patent to
competitors are also relevant considerations under this Factor. A court
should consider how thoroughly the publication is disseminated in the rele-
vant industry and whether an ordinary business or actor in that field sub-
scribes to the periodical, attends the trade show, or otherwise would be
exposed to the medium discussing the patentee or its patent.
Proposed Secondary Factor 6. Markings on the infringed product.
Infringers are only liable for monetary damages under Section 287(a)
when the patented product is marked with "Patent" or "Pat." followed by
the patent number.276 When marking the product is impractical, the statute
permits monetary damages when the product's label or packaging is prop-
erly marked.277 Marking provides consumers of the good constructive no-
tice of the patent.278 Absent marking the actual product, damages are only
274. Peter H. Lewis, Web Concern Gets Patent For Its Model Of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1998, at DI, D5; U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (filed Sept. 4, 1996) (issued Aug. 11, 1998).
275. See, e.g., Keith Turner, Highlights from the Patents: A Review of U.S. Patents in the Field of
Organic Process Development Published during January and February 2006, 10 ORGANIC PROCESS
RES. & DEv. 381-90 (2006); Keith Turner, Highlights from the Patents: A Review of U.S. Patents in the
Field of Organic Process Development Published during November and December 2005, 10 ORGANIC
PROCESS RES. & DEV. 184-93 (2006).
276. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
277. See id.
278. See, e.g., Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Coop. Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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allowed when the patentee proves she notified the accused infringer, but
damages are then limited to conduct occurring after notice is provided.279
Marking the product covered by the patent therefore serves as "notice to
the public" of the patent.280 In determining whether the defendant knew or
should have known of the high risk of infringement, then, evidence of the
notice marked on the infringed product is important. 281
But simply marking the patented article should not be dispositive for
several reasons. First, as a matter of statutory construction, Congress could
not have meant that enhanced damages under Section 284 turns on whether
the article is marked. There is no statutory language that links the enhanced
damages provision to Section 287(a). Of course, enhancement of damages
presumes that the patentee first proved actual damages, so as a practical
matter, enhanced damages for willfulness are in fact limited to marked
articles. But if Congress intended to allow enhanced damage awards simply
based on marking of the articles, Sections 284 and 287(a) would more
clearly reflect such a policy choice.
Second, as already discussed, marking the patented article is not al-
ways practical. This is especially true when the patented article is not tang-
ible, for example when the patent covers a process or business method. For
tangible goods that are too small or irregularly shaped, marking on the
packaging may not suffice either because the accused infringer may have
obtained the patented article only after the packaging (and the notice of the
patent) have been discarded. Third, the accused infringer may be located in
a remote geography where the patented article is not available. Even
though the article may be clearly marked, the marking does not serve as
adequate notice to a defendant that has never seen a sample. The infringing
conduct may still be willful, though, because the defendant may very well
have copied the patented article from a drawing or photograph that did not
include the notice marks.
279. See id.
280. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) states in part "Patentees... may give notice to the public that [the patented
article] is patented" by marking the article as described.
281. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2009-1504, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010 at *64-65
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (infringement found to be willful based in part on evidence that defendant had received
patented product sales kits that were marked "patented" and referenced the patent-in-suit).
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Proposed Secondary Factor 7. Length of time between patent issuance and
commencement of the allegedly infringing activity.
Timing of clearance searches are relevant considerations in trademark
infringement suits. 282 Allegations of willful trademark infringement can be
effectively rebutted by showing that a full trademark search was conducted
before the defendant began using the mark in question. 283 The Lanham Act
expressly defines damage enhancement as compensatory and not punitive
in nature, 284 but instead permits awards of the defendant's profits when
infringement was willful. 285 In trademark practice, then, awarding defen-
dant's profits stands in the place of treble damages in patent law-both
provisions deter the ignorance of another's valid rights, albeit by different
means.
In Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats, the mark owner sued Quak-
er over its use of "Thirst Aid" in its advertisements for Gatorade.286 The
district court awarded profits to the mark owner because Quaker did not
conduct a basic trademark search until just days before the advertisements
aired, continued to broadcast the ads even after learning of the mark's prior
registration, and did not obtain a pre-conduct opinion of potential trade-
mark issues or otherwise take "reasonable precautions" to avoid trademark
infringement. 287 But the Seventh Circuit overturned the award of profits,
interpreting Quaker's conduct as something less than bad faith.288
At least one district court has already awarded enhanced damages un-
der the Seagate standard based in part on the time that had elapsed between
the issuance of the patent and the commencement of the infringing con-
duct.289 In that case, the patentee owned a patent on an extended release
drug formulation. Almost two years after the patent issued, a rival pharma-
ceutical company began selling a generic version of the patented drug. The
district court found the competitor liable for willful infringement because
282. See MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC., OBTAINING USING AND PROTECTING
TRADEMARKS Part 3 § 13 (2006).
283. See id.
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
285. See id. Circuits are split over whether a willfulness finding is necessary to award profits.
Compare, e.g., Adray v. Adray-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 1996) (a finding of willful in-
fringement is a requirement before profits can be awarded) with Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399
F.3d 168, 173-76 (3rd Cir. 2005) (willfulness is a factor to consider but is not a requirement for an
award of profits).
286. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992).
287. Id. at 961-62.
288. See id. at 962.
289. See Depomed, Inc. v. Ivax Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1185-86 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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"[a] reasonable party would ... have had ample time to investigate and
discover the relevant patent. '290
No court has extended this logic to declare that the mere passing of
time between patent issuance and infringing conduct mandates a finding of
willfulness. But courts may be tempted to heavily weigh the timing in their
analyses. Like in the trademark context, anyone can search valid and ex-
pired U.S. patents on the Patent Office web site from anywhere in the
world as soon as they issue.291 No special expertise is required, and results
include scanned images of the full patent documents. 292 In addition, calcu-
lation of the time between issuance of the patent and the start of the defen-
dant's infringing conduct is objective and straight-forward.
But given the Federal Circuit's statement of the new standard and the
historical consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding
allegedly infringing conduct, courts should be weary of such a bright line
rule. Especially in light of Judge Newman's concurrence, evidence of the
time lapse between the grant of the patent and the infringing conduct
should be viewed in the context of the general practices, including typical
product development and launch timelines for the industry involved. 293 In a
fast-developing industry, such as computer hardware, two years may
represent several generations of technology, and may reasonably be consi-
dered "ample time to investigate and discover the relevant patent. ' 294 But
in a slower-developing industry, where new product launches require years
of post-development effort, two years may not be "ample time."
As in the trademark arena, timing may be an important consideration
in assessing whether an accused infringer knew or should have known of
the objectively high risk of infringement. But unless and until the Federal
Circuit (or U.S. Supreme Court) announces an affirmative duty to conduct
a thorough patent search just before launching a new product or service,
courts should refrain from considering the timing of patent issuance and
infringing conduct as dispositive.
290. Id. at 1186.
291. See U.S. Patent Full-Text Database Boolean Search, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/
search-bool.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). Patent applications that have not yet matured into issued
patents are also available from the Patent Office web site free of charge. See USPTO Full-Page Image
Database (AIW) Direct Image Viewing, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/appimg.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2009).
292. For example, searching for "6314473" on the U.S. Patent Full-Text Database Boolean Search
web page (see supra, note 291) displays a scanned image of the first page of U.S. Patent No. 6,314,473.
293. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1385 (Newman, J., concurring) ("standards of fair
commerce, including [the] reasonableness of the actions taken in the particular circumstances" should
inform the willfulness inquiry).
294. Depomed, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
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V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED FACTORS TO
COHESIVE TECHNOLOGIES V. WATERS CORPORATION29 5
Among the early cases applying Seagate to a willful infringement
claim, Cohesive stands out for two reasons. First, the district court boldly
asserted a six-factor test ipse dixit, but then applied only a few of those
factors to the case at bar.296 Second, the court conflated the two-step Sea-
gate framework and analyzed all of its proposed factors simultaneously.297
But the opinion contains a very detailed discussion of the facts introduced
into evidence, and therefore represents an excellent test case for the Pro-
posed Factors discussed in Part IV, supra. Despite the formalistic and func-
tionalistic flaws in the court's reasoning, application of this note's
Proposed Factors to the facts of the case clearly indicate that the result was
correct: patentee Cohesive Technologies did not carry its burden to show
by clear and convincing evidence that defendant Waters Corporation acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringe-
ment of a valid patent. But had Cohesive met its burden on the threshold
question, the facts of the case indicate that Waters knew of the risk or
should have known because the risk was obvious.
A. The Facts in Cohesive Technologies v. Waters
Cohesive Technologies manufactures and sells equipment for high
performance liquid chromatography (HPLC), a critical technique used to
separate chemically similar compounds from each other. The technique
uses high pressured liquids to force a small amount of the chemical mixture
through a tube filled with an insoluble solid ("column"). The interaction
between the chemical mixture and the solid in the column separates the
mixture into its components. Cohesive sued Waters Corporation for in-
fringing two of its patents covering improvements in the composition of the
insoluble solid material inside the columns. 298
Pursuant to Section 122(b) of the Patent Act, Cohesive's first patent
application was published in May 1997.299 Within a week, scientists at
Waters had obtained a copy of the published application. 300 Soon thereaf-
295. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2007).
296. See id. at 103-07.
297. See id. at 103-04.
298. See id. at 88.
299. Id. at 104. See also 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2006) ("each application for a patent shall be
published.., promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for
which a benefit is sought under this title").
300. Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
20101 1019
CHICA GO-KENT LA WREVIEW
ter, Waters began comparing a prototype of the Cohesive column to a Wa-
ters column already in development. 30 1 Waters' tests revealed several dif-
ferences in the solid particles inside the two columns. First, Cohesive's
insoluble solid particles were on average 67% larger than Waters' insoluble
solid particles. 302 Second, Waters' solid particles "collapsed" at liquid
pressures exceeding 5,000 psi while Cohesive's solid particles were "rigid"
and did not collapse even at liquid pressures up to 10,000 psi.30 3
Waters began producing its columns in February 1998 while testing of
the Cohesive column was still in progress.304 Cohesive's patent issued on
June 30, 1998.305 In August the Waters scientists presented their findings to
its in-house attorney, who drafted an opinion of non-infringement in Sep-
tember 1998.306 After Cohesive filed suit, Waters retained outside counsel,
who rendered an opinion that Waters' column did not literally infringe the
Cohesive patent, nor did it infringe Cohesive's patent under the doctrine of
equivalents. 307
B. The Likelihood that Waters Would Infringe Cohesive's Patent was Not
Objectively High
After Seagate, a patentee seeking enhanced damages under Sec-
tion 284 must now initially prove, "by clear and convincing evidence, that
the defendant acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent. ' 308 Applying the Proposed Thre-
shold Factors described in Part IV.B., supra, to the evidence in the record
reveals that Cohesive did not meet its burden.
Under Proposed Threshold Factor 1, evidence that the defendant at-
tempted to design around the patented technology strongly suggests that the
risk that it would infringe the patent was objectively low. Upon learning
about Cohesive's patent application, Waters immediately began investigat-
ing the Cohesive column to determine whether the new columns it was
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See U.S. Patent No. 5,772,874 (filed Jun. 11, 1996).
306. See Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05.
307. See id. at 104 n.4. Infringement of a patent under the doctrine of equivalents accounts for the
limits of language in accurately and completely describing an invention. See Cochran, supra note 199,
at 253-54, 274. In the classic test for equivalence, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents occurs
when the accused product or process "if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result." Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)
(internal citation omitted).
308. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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developing were covered by Cohesive's draft claims. 309 Extensive testing
of the two columns revealed that the solid particles performed very diffe-
rently at extreme pressures and that the solid particles were significantly
different in size. 310 While Waters had already designed its column, the
evidence at least generates a strong inference that Waters was willing to
modify its column technology if testing revealed that its solid particles
were substantially similar to the solid particles claimed in the Cohesive
application. Proposed Threshold Factor 1 favors Waters.
Proposed Threshold Factor 2 suggests, inter alia, that evidence that
the defendant obtained a thorough opinion of counsel concluding its pro-
posed conduct would not infringe may still suggest an objectively high
likelihood of infringement. 311 The opinion's conclusions as to the validity
and enforceablitiy of the patent are important even when the opinion also
concludes that the likelihood of infringement is low. 3 12 Waters relied on an
opinion by its in-house counsel that the Waters column would not infringe
Cohesive's claims as they appeared in the published application. 313 Be-
cause the application had not matured into a patent at the time Waters
launched its product, the in-house opinion could not consider whether Co-
hesive's patent was valid or enforceable. 314 Proposed Threshold Factor 2
favors Waters.
Proposed Threshold Factor 3 suggests an objectively high likelihood
of infringing a valid patent when the patentee's market is saturated with
patents or features a fast pace of innovation. Unfortunately, evidence of the
HPLC market characteristics is not in the trial record. 315 But some informa-
tion is readily available from the patent-in-suit and Patent Office web site.
Cohesive's patent is listed in Class 210 ("Liquid Purification or Separa-
tion"), Subclass 198.2 ("With Means to Add Treating Material: Chromato-
graphy").316 A search of the Patent Office web site reveals that nearly
2,000 patents have issued in that Class and Subclass since 1976. 317 At a
rate exceeding one issued patent per week, the class appears to be both
saturated and quickly developing. The data suggest that the risk that anyone
309. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, 104 (D. Mass. 2007).
310. Id.
311. See supra Part IV.B.2.
312. See id.
313. See Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05, 106.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 103-07.
316. U.S. Patent No. 5,772,874 at [52] (filed Jun. 11, 1996).
317. United States Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Full-Text Database Manual Search,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (search performed Oct. 21, 2007; search term:
"ccl/210/198.2").
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launching new products in the HPLC equipment market is objectively high.
Proposed Threshold Factor 3 therefore favors Cohesive.
Under Proposed Threshold Factor 4, credible arguments of invalidity
and unenforceability suggest that the likelihood of infringing a valid patent
is objectively low. 318 The Cohesive court ignored the opinion of non-
infringement Waters obtained from outside counsel after Cohesive filed
suit alleging infringement. 319 But those arguments raised credible chal-
lenges to the patent's validity and enforceability to the record.320 In addi-
tion, Waters raised arguments of invalidity and unenforceability that
ultimately failed.321 The unenforceability argument was credible enough
that it required eight pages of discussion on Water's motion for judgment
as a matter of law. 322 Due to the wealth of credible non-infringement, inva-
lidity and unenforceability arguments, Proposed Threshold Factor 4 favors
Waters.
In sum, Waters manufactured and sold HPLC columns verifiably dif-
ferent in composition and performance from that claimed in the Cohesive
patent. It reasonably relied on a competent opinion of non-infringement
from in-house counsel. Waters raised credible issues of invalidity and un-
enforceability at trial. The HPLC market is saturated with patents and
quickly developing. Waters is favored by weighty evidence strongly sug-
gesting that the likelihood it would infringe was low. Only weak evidence
of patent saturation and face pace of innovation favoring Cohesive. The
likelihood that Waters' activities would infringe a valid patent was there-
fore objectively low under the Proposed Threshold Factors.
C Waters Did Not Know Nor Should Have Known of the Objectively-
Defined Risk of Infringing a Valid Patent.
Even if the court concluded that the facts represented an objectively
high risk that Waters' actions constituted infringement of a valid patent, a
court applying the Proposed Secondary Factors discussed in Part IV.C,
supra, would not have concluded that Waters knew or should have known
of that risk.
Under Proposed Secondary Factor 1, cease and desist letters that give
notice of the conduct that allegedly infringing a patent strongly suggests
318. See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App'x 284, 291 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
319. See Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104 n.4.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 94-95 (validity); id. at 95-103 (unenforceability).
322. See id. at 95-103.
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that the defendant knew of the risk that its actions constitute infringement
of a valid patent. There is no evidence in the record, however, that Cohe-
sive sent Waters a cease and desist letter or otherwise communicated alle-
gations of infringement before filing suit. Waters clearly knew of the patent
application, and very likely knew of Cohesive's issued patent. 323 But here
Waters used the published patent application to ensure that its own product
would not infringe the claims if they matured into an issued patent. 324 On
balance, Proposed Secondary Factor 1 favors Waters.
Proposed Secondary Factor 2 favors the patentee if the accused in-
fringer obtained an opinion that its conduct was likely to infringe a valid
patent. Here, however, Waters obtained and reasonably relied on a compe-
tent opinion of non-infringement from its in-house counsel. 325 Although
Waters obtained additional opinions of invalidity and unenforceability,
those opinions were generated after Cohesive filed suit and therefore were
not available when Waters was developing its competing HPLC column. 32 6
But the first opinion of non-infringement by its in-house counsel is enough
that Proposed Secondary Factor 2 favors Waters.
Under Proposed Secondary Factor 3, evidence that the patentee and
the accused infringer were in a special relationship-for example as licen-
sor-licensee-may infer that the accused infringer should have known of
the high risk of infringement. Strictly applying Proposed Factor 3 to the
Cohesive facts, however, favors Waters. No facts in the court's opinion
suggest that any Waters employee was in a special relationship with a Co-
hesive employee. The companies were not under any kind of contractual
partnership, joint venture, or other collaborative effort.
On the other hand, Waters and Cohesive are direct competitors in a
niche market. Their corporate headquarters are within ten miles of each
other. 327 While these facts were apparently not entered into evidence at
trial, they do create an inference that the two companies were well aware of
each other before this litigation. At best, however, this information merely
creates a presumption of awareness that certainly falls short of Seagate's
323. See id. at 104-105.
324. See id. at 104.
325. See id. at 104-06.
326. See id. at 104 n.4.
327. Waters Corporation is headquartered in Milford, Massachusetts, while Cohesive Technologies
is headquartered in Franklin, Massachusetts, less than ten miles south on 1-495. See Waters Corpora-
tion, www.waters.com/webassets/other/corp/about/quick.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); Business-
Week, Cohesive Technologies, Inc.: Private Company Information,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld= 2 6 668 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009).
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heightened willfulness. At most, Proposed Secondary Factor 3 minimally
favors Cohesive.
Under Proposed Secondary Factor 4, an actor with a high level of skill
compared to a PHOSITA is presumed to have a more thorough knowledge
of her field of expertise than an ordinary layperson. The Waters employees
involved in developing the HPLC column were highly skilled, well-
educated, and were aware of Cohesive's HPLC products and pending pa-
tent application.328 In short, the Waters employees were at least as skilled
as a PHOSITA and in the same market as Cohesive. This suggests that
Waters should have known of the high likelihood that manufacturing its
HPLC column would infringe a valid patent. Proposed Secondary Factor 4
favors Cohesive.
Proposed Secondary Factor 5 favors the patentee when news of the pa-
tent is widely published. But there is no evidence in the record that Cohe-
sive's HPLC column technology was publicized in the media or in trade
magazines before Waters developed its competing column. Proposed Sec-
ondary Factor 5, then, favors Waters.
Under Proposed Secondary Factor 6, markings on the patented article
weakly favors a finding that the accused infringer knew or should have
known that its activity would likely infringe a valid patent. Here, however,
the prototype Cohesive column obtained by Waters was not yet patented. 329
Thus, it was not marked with a patent number under Section 287(a) of the
Patent Act. Proposed Secondary Factor 6 favors Waters.
Finally, under Proposed Secondary Factor 7, evidence that the accused
infringer began developing its competing product or process long after the
relevant patent issued slightly favors a finding that the infringer should
have known that it risked infringing a valid patent. In Cohesive, however,
Waters began developing its own HPLC column before the Cohesive patent
issued.330 Waters' awareness of the published patent application is not re-
levant to this inquiry because the claims published in the patent application
are almost never the same as the claims that issue.Proposed Secondary
Factor 7 therefore favors Waters.
The strongest evidence in the Proposed Secondary Factors favors Wa-
ters. Waters did not receive a cease and desist letter describing how it may
be infringing Cohesive's patent. Nonetheless, Waters obtained and relied
on a competent opinion of non-infringement, even though it developed its
column before Cohesive's patent issued. There was no evidence that Cohe-
328. See Cohesive Techs., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
329. See id. at 105.
330. See id.
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sive's column was widely publicized or that the prototype Cohesive col-
umn used for comparative testing was marked with a patent number. Cohe-
sive is favored only slightly in that the two companies are headquartered
within ten miles of each other and Waters' product development team ap-
pears to be highly skilled in the art of HPLC column technology. There-
fore, even if Cohesive had proved that there was an objectively high
likelihood that Waters' HPLC column would infringe its valid patent, Co-
hesive could not have shown that Waters knew or should have known
about that risk of infringement by clear and convincing evidence.
CONCLUSION
Faced with a new standard for willful patent infringement, district
courts are already applying Seagate in situations where millions of dollars
of compensatory damages are at stake. Early indications strongly suggest
that the courts-and their litigants-require more concrete guidance in
applying Seagate.
Proposed Factors for applying Seagate emerge from the American tort
law and the policies underlying the U.S. patent system. Of these factors,
four Proposed Threshold Factors guide courts in assessing whether the
accused infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its con-
duct would infringe a valid patent. Seven Proposed Secondary Factors as-
sist courts in determining whether the objectively high risk (as defined
through the Proposed Threshold Factors) was known to the accused in-
fringer, or was so obvious that the infringer should have known of the risk.
These Proposed Factors provide district courts with structure for eva-
luating the probative value of evidence brought by litigants, while minimiz-
ing inflexibility in their application. And because the totality of the
circumstances standard seems to have survived Seagate, courts should still
consider relevant evidence outside these factors.
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